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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The global nature of the Great Recession led to the resurgence of literature trying
to find a link between international channels and international business cycle
synchronization. Understanding the impact of international channels on exaggerating
fluctuations in macro variables is of paramount importance. Sharp decline in global
output following the 2007 crash was the worst seen in decades. According to BEA
estimates, U.S GDP fell by 6.2, consumption by 4.3 and investment by 22 percent during
the last quarter of 2008. This behavior was experienced amongst most OECD countries,
even though the source of the negative shock had its roots largely in the U.S. There was
an unprecedented synchronous downturn amongst most developed countries. Figure 1
represents the global nature of the recent crisis and demonstrates a remarkable
synchronous collapse in economic growth rates across the developed world.
Furthermore, the synchronous behavior of output growth rates is stronger during the
2008 recession than in years prior or after. This provides some evidence, albeit
anecdotal, that cross-country correlations do not exhibit symmetric behavior during
expansions and recessions. In chapter 3, I investigate this asymmetric behavior using a
two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. The biggest contribution of
chapter 3 is to test how macro variables move across two countries by allowing for a
switch between expansionary and recessionary phases. I find that variables move more
synchronously during recessions than expansions.
An equally important question arising from the great recession was the impact of
monetary policy on macro variables. Most central banks went beyond the normal limits
of monetary policy. In that regard, I test the long run monetary neutrality, which states
that money has no effect on real variables in the long run. I focus on testing how
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temporal aggregation affects the results. These tests are carried out in chapter 4 of this
paper.
Figure 1: Real GDP growth in percent, annual
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To combat the global recession, most central banks used monetary and
quantitative easing. This brings to the forefront a heavily researched, yet inconclusive
macro phenomenon of money neutrality; which states that money only temporarily
effects macro variables. I explore these two macroeconomic questions. First, I
investigate how propagation of shocks through international financial channels
asymmetrically affects output correlation. Second, I carry out statistical tests to test for
money neutrality in G-7 countries.
The impact on an economy due to international interdependence can be due to
either trade or financial linkages. Like the Great Depression of the 1930’s, the financial
crisis that plagued much of the developed world in 2007 has led to considerable
research seeking to understand the causes and nature of such global phenomenon. Even
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though the source of the financial crisis of 2007 was limited to a few countries, the
economic impact was unquestionably global.
Trade alone could not account for the severity of the synchronous downturn. Given
that regional trade far exceeds that between regions, trade alone cannot explain such
output correlation. Moreover, since U.S was the severest source for the financial crisis,
the assumption for trade to be an important channel would imply that synchronization
between the U.S and regional trade partners such as Canada or Mexico should be far
greater. But we see a corresponding sharp decline in output for countries that are only
marginally linked to the U.S. Hence, it is worth investigating the role financial channels
play. To represent financial integration, an examination of total short-term claims of U.S
reporting banks of claims on foreign economy is warranted. Table 1 shows total stock of
U.S banks claims on other countries with up to and less than one year until maturity.
The amount of new or near maturity claims issued contracted sharply following the
recession. In normal times, new claims are regularly issued and many maturing ones
are reissued quarterly. The countries included are the ones with which U.S has strong
financial ties. Many OECD countries experienced a sharp fall in short-term claims of U.S
banks during 2008. As the Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, Rakesh
Mohan said: “Our problems are mainly due to the sell-off by foreign institutional
investors in the domestic markets leading to a sharp reduction in net capital inflows
and the sharp slowdown in global economic activity and external demand” (Mohan,
2009)
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Table 1: Bank Assets
Short term claims of U.S banks on select OECD countries in $US millions
2008, Q1
2008, Q4
Percent change
Canada
168,565
145,010
France
69,098
55,287
Germany
65,933
39,266
Ireland
27,471
23,550
Italy
25,521
17,243
Netherlands
46,995
37,230
Spain
28,367
18,420
Data is from BIS International Banking Statistics

-13.97%
-19.98%
-40.4%
-14.27%
-32.43%
-20.77%
-35.06%

To sum up my motivation to analyze financial links and their asymmetric effect
on output correlation, I run some simple regressions before getting into the theoretical
model. I use change in real GDP growth from year to year as the dependent variable. I
run the same regressions across two time periods. One from 1996 to 2006 and another
for just one year; December 2007 to December 2008. The latter period represents the
financial crash. To measure sudden change in capital outflows in a country, I take total
capital inflows from the U.S. as a percent of that countries’ GDP using U.S Treasury
International Capital data (TIC) in year t-1. To differentiate between financial and trade
links, I take exports to the U.S as a percent of GDP, or variable X. To represent “flight to
quality” by investors, I include credit rating of a country, representing their ability to
raise more capital. Capital withdrawals will affect countries with lower sovereign credit
rating more severely. Standard and Poor provides sovereign rating ranging from AAA to
B for the countries in my sample and like Devereux and Yetman, I assign a numerical
value to each rating as represented in Table 2. I interact the rating term (CR) with X and
TIC to account for “flight to quality”. The data is for 29 OECD countries with available
data.1

1 The countries included are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,

France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico,
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Table 2: Credit Rating conversion
S&P letter rating My conversion
Meaning
AAA
0
Extremely strong
AA+
1
Very strong
AA
2
Very strong
AA3
Very strong
A+
4
Strong
A
5
Strong
A6
Strong
BBB+
7
Adequate
BBB
8
Adequate
BBB9
Adequate
BB+
10
Faces major future uncertainties
BB
11
Faces major future uncertainties
B
12
Faces major uncertainties
Standard and Poor sovereign credit rating of a country
The results are presented in Table 3. There is strong evidence that not only does
financial flows play a significant role in the financial crisis, but that the impact is
stronger during recessions. Moreover, trade appears to be less important. The measure
of capital flows is significant in all cases and has an adverse effect on GDP. This effect
becomes stronger when capital inflows interact with credit rating. The interactive term
between credit rating and capital inflows from the U.S is negative and statistically
significant, supporting the notion of “flight to quality”.
To summarize, financial channels are important in propagating shocks to output
and more importantly those effects are stronger during recessions.

Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United State,
United Kingdom
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Table 3: Asymmetrical significance of financial channels on output growth
Financial impact during expansionary years 1996-2006
X

0.04
(0.788)

0.009
(0.89)
−0.016
(0.76)

0.05
(0.695)
CRX
0.039
(0.144)
TIC
−0.001
−0.001
−0.017
(0.045)
(0.006)
(0.005)
CRTIC
−0.046
−0.08
(0.022)
(0.009)
Adjusted R2
0.02
0.14
0.44
0.29
0.4
N
319
319
319
319
319
Dependent variable: change in real GDP growth rate between December 1996 and 2006
p values are in parenthesis and coefficients that are bold are significant at the 5% level
X represents exports to the U.S.
CR represents S&P sovereign foreign currency credit rating. Capital withdrawals are likely to
affect more significantly countries with worse rating.
CRX is the interactive term between X and CR
TIC is gross capital inflows from the US as a percent of GDP in t-1. This measures a country’s
sudden outflow of capital using US Treasury data
CRTIC is the interactive term between TIC and CR

Financial impact on the ‘Great Recession’ 2007-2008
Exports to
US (X)
CRX

−0.024
(0.844)

0.003
(0.99)
−0.006
(0.77)

−0.043
(0.665)
0.039
(0.144)
TIC
−0.005
−0.006
−0.047
(0.035)
(0.006)
(0.006)
CRTIC
−0.057
−0.1
(0.012)
(0.019)
Adjusted R2
0.036
0.07
0.14
0.3
0.33
N
29
29
29
29
29
Dependent variable: change in real GDP growth rate between December 2007 and 2008

The neutrality of money is amongst one of the most important research question
in macroeconomics. Given how much emphasis was paid by the Federal Reserve, the
European Central Bank and other central bankers around the world in combatting the
recession of 2007, it is worth investigating the role of money in impacting macro
variables. The Fed took the traditional measure of reducing the federal funds rate from
5.25 percent in September 2007 to between 0-0.25 percent by December 2008. (Rich,
2009). They also took several untraditional measures like buying long term debt worth
$1.75 trillion in the form of mortgage backed securities and making direct loans to
private corporations. AIG, for example got an emergency loan to the tune of $85 billion.
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The ECB, Bank of England and other central banks took similar measures. Even though
these policies had the desired results of providing stimulus in the short run, it is
important to understand whether such policies have any long run effects on the
economy.
Neutrality of money states that permanent movements in money supply do not
effect real variables like real GDP, employment and real consumption. Any affect it has
is temporary and disappears once rational agents adjust their behavior. There are two
related concepts: the long run money neutrality (LMN) and the long run money super
neutrality (LMSN). LMSN hypothesis states that permanent movements in the growth
rate of money supply, rather than the level of money supply, has no effect on real
variables. Given the importance of both LMN and LMSN on monetary policy, it is worth
examining this considerably debated topic. Such tests provide several empirical
complications and one must be careful in the kind of data and tests used.
Empirical tests on monetary neutrality have been much less convincing than
theory would suggest. Differences in statistical methods and data sources used in earlier
studies might be a source of such disparity in results. Temporal aggregation of data and
structural regime changes can also distort results. In chapter 4 I focus on testing the
impact of temporal aggregation on results. I use monthly, quarterly and yearly data and
find that VAR results are very sensitive to temporal aggregation. When aggregating data
at the annual frequency, time series autocorrelations are driven down to zero. (Tiao,
1972) (Rossana & Hu, 2017) As in Rossana and Hu, I use I (1) data, which upon
temporal aggregation of the data results in only on nonzero sample autocorrelation in
the asymptotic limit. Rossana and Seater provide evidence that once data has been
aggregated to annual frequency, asymptotic limits in Tiao (1972) are reached in every
time series. This implies that any cyclical variation in the data is driven out by annual
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aggregation and estimated coefficients in time series regression can be wrongfully
estimated to be zero. (Rossana & Seater, 1992) (Rossana & Seater, 1995) Hence, there is
a potential bias towards time-series regression finding monetary neutrality by driving
coefficients to zero. In chapter 4, I investigate the effects temporal aggregation might
have on money neutrality tests. I use the Fisher and Seater framework to estimate the
Bartlett estimator and the King and Watson VAR approach to test for neutrality and the
effects of temporal aggregation for G-7 countries. The results are mixed but one very
appealing feature of the F & S test is that the results are not biased with that temporal
aggregation. There might still be biases from structural changes, which I do not address
in this paper. Rossana and Hu investigate biases due to temporal aggregation and
structural change for the U.S economy (Rossana & Hu, 2017).
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
In this paper, I am investigating two important macro questions. The focus of my
first question is to study the asymmetric role of financial linkages on international
business cycle correlation. The second question focuses on considering the role of
temporal aggregation on money neutrality tests. Regarding the first, there are two
important phenomena to consider. First, international financial markets have seen a
momentous increase in capital flow in recent decades. (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, The
external wealth of nations mark 2: Revised and extended measures of foreign assets and
liabilities for industrial and developing countries, 2007) Cross border asset holdings
have grown to such an extent that for some developed economies it exceeds their GDP.
(Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2003). Various studies have analyzed welfare gains from
international financial integration in a theoretical and empirical setting. (Bonfiglioli,
2008) (Kose, Prasad, & Terrones, Does financial globalization promote risk sharing?,
2009b) (Nicolo & Juvenal, 2012) (Devereux & Sutherland, Evaluating international
financial integration under leverage constraints, 2011) Economic theory contends that
countries allocate their resources to diversify risk across borders. We are moving
toward an ever-increasing integration of financial markets because information
technology is lowering transactions costs and of innovations in financial assets. One
way to quantify financial integration is to look at bank portfolios and their claims on
foreign countries’ assets. Bank portfolios are a direct way to measure home bank’s
influence over foreign country’s investment. As described later in this chapter, this is
the mechanism through which financial propagation affects both home and foreign
countries in my model.
A second phenomenon that has generated substantial research is measuring
whether business cycles across countries have become more synchronized. The answer
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to this question is less conclusive and varies with the source of shocks, but does point
towards an increase in synchronization. (Bordo & Helbling, 2003). Their findings
indicate that global shocks are more important in driving this integration and that trade
only plays a modest role. Bordo and Helbling find a trend towards increased
synchronization across diverse exchange rate regimes. (Bordo & Helbling, International
business cycle synchronization in historical perspective, 2011) Using a factor-structural
VAR, Stock and Watson analyzed the structure of international business cycle dynamics
and found that common shocks across countries increases volatility and
synchronization. (Stock & Watson, 2005). They found BCS during the 2007 crisis to be
significant amongst G-7 countries.
Even though evidence for global business cycle synchronization is inconclusive,
one observes business cycles between certain countries and depending on nature of
shocks to be more strongly correlated now than in past decades. And this leads to two
fundamental questions that are addressed in this chapter; “does financial integration
have any contribution to this synchronization?” and “whether these contributions have
an asymmetric effect on macro variables like consumption and investment depending
on the state of the economy?” A thorough understanding would enable policymakers to
counter observable shocks through these channels. The goal of this chapter is to provide
a simple, testable model for these assertions. I use an already developed theoretical
model to test the first question. For the second question, I estimate a parameter via a
Markov regime process that represents the two states of a business cycle. The
parameter then enables me to measure cross-country behavior of consumption,
investment, interest rate, asset portfolios and asset prices across recessions and
expansions. I find that international synchronization during recessions is stronger than
expansions. Guillermo Ordonez studies the asymmetries of financial frictions and finds
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it stronger amongst financially less developed countries (Ordonez, 2013) This paper
tries to add to that answer. Specifically, I find that strong financial links cause
asymmetric synchronous behavior.
A surge in global trade flows in recent decades is a potential candidate in causing
business cycles to be more correlated. However, most of the increase in trade is interregional and not global. (Kose & Yi, Can the standard international business cycle model
explain the relation between trade and comovement, 2006) And since international BCS
is across continents, trade alone cannot be a significant factor. Hence it is worth
investigating the role financial linkages plays both in transmitting shocks and
magnifying the effects of those shocks. Empirical evidence is inconclusive. Using a panel
of twenty countries Kalemli and his co-authors find there to be a negative correlation
between financial links and transmission of shocks (Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, &
Peydro, 2009). Imbs find that the correlation between the two is strongly dependent on
the source of shocks where common shock tends to lower BCS and country-specific
shock increases synchronization between countries that are more ﬁnancially integrated
(Cesa-Bianchi, Imbs, & Saleheen, 2016). There is also evidence that BCS is stronger for
countries that have more financial linkages. (Imbs, The real effects of financial
integration, 2006) (Imbs, Trade, finance, specialization and synchronization, 2004)
However, many studies like these are purely empirical exercises and are not based on
micro-founded models. Krugman points out that unlike trade literature, international
financial studies lacks a multiplier effect (Krugman, 2008). One where financial shocks
in one country affect macro variables in both home and foreign countries. This chapter
uses the theoretical model developed by Devereux and Yetman and the solution
technique developed by Devereux and Sutherland to test my hypothesis. (Devereux &
Yetman, Leverage constraints and the international transmission of shocks, 2010)
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(Devereux & Sutherland, Country portfolios in open economy macro models, 2011).
Devereux and Yetman develop a micro-founded model of balance sheet channel for
international transmitted shocks. The financial multipliers pointed out by Krugman are
incorporated through cross-country balance sheet connections distributed between
investors and financial institutions (Krugman, 2008). For example, if asset prices fall in
country A, independent of the nature of the shock, it will negatively impact balance
sheets for institutions and the economy in country A. Since country B investors have
investments in financial institutions of country A, their portfolio and thus consumption
also deteriorates. In the crisis of 2007, a sharp decline in asset values led to balance
sheet contractions and a fire sale of assets, perpetuating a further decline in balance
sheets which resulted in a vicious downward spiral.
While this dynamic has been widely studied, the effect of these contractions on
international transmission and macroeconomic activity has not received nearly as much
attention. The model developed by Devereux and Yetman allows for financial frictions
or distortions in credit markets, which is critical when evaluating financial meltdowns
like the one in 2007. I describe the model in section 3. Their focus is to compare
transmission of macro shocks across countries under different financial structures such
as segmented and integrated equity and bond markets. They find that balance sheet
constraints and portfolio interdependence can generate statistically significant impulse
responses in both home and foreign countries. The model draws on (Kiyotaki & Moore,
1997), where leverage constraints are binding for the investors. The role of portfolio
links in cross-country contagion due to financial shocks is also well established.
(Rigobon, 2003) (Pavlova & Rigobon, 2008) The most salient contribution of the model
developed by Devereux is that it allows for endogenous portfolio interdependence.
(Devereux & Sutherland, Country portfolios in open economy macro models, 2011)
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They conclude that financial integration in both bond and equity markets generates
high positive co-movement in macro variables and has welfare gains.
The next step in refining this model is to evaluate results during expansionary
and recessionary phases in a business cycle. The reasoning being that consumers and
businesses react asymmetrically to a shock to their portfolio depending on the phase of
the business cycle. I hypothesize that this asymmetry rests on the assertion that people
react strongly when their portfolio loses value compared to an equivalent portfolio
increase. One can argue that risk averse people will reduce spending by a larger percent
with a loss in income than they will increase spending with an increase in income. To
this effect my paper adds to the literature in a few different ways. Firstly, I add a source
of shock in the theoretical model that is attributed to the financial sector. Devereux and
Yetman have the usual productivity shock only. This provides insights into the impact of
the financial sector on the macro economy. Secondly, I estimate the parameter that
differentiates the ability for investors in a country to raise capital based on the state of
the economy. I find that during recessions, investors find it harder to raise capital but
Devereux and Yetman take this parameter to be fixed. A Markov-Switching regime
model provides an array of toolkits to generate this estimation. (Hamilton, 1994)
(Hamiton, 2005) In practice the two-step maximum likelihood estimation and a
MATLAB customizable package developed by Marcelo Perlin for regime switching
models provide the statistical basis for parameter. (Perlin, 2015)
Regarding monetary neutrality tests, a series of empirical tests have been
designed by economists to test for long-run effects of changes in money supply. Fisher
and Seater’s ARIMA and King and Watson’s VAR frameworks are among the most
widely used econometric tools to test LMN. (Fisher & Seater, 1993) (King & Watson,
1997). Results differ considerably depending on data sources, aggregation techniques
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and empirical methods. Given the undisputed theoretical grounds for LMN, empirical
studies have been equally discouraging. Fisher and Seater (93) consider annual post
WWI German and annual U.S data from 1869-1975 and find little support in favor of
LMN in the U.S and reject LMSN in German data. Fisher and Seater’s results were on U. S
data showed LMN by including dummy variables for the Great Depression period
(Boschen & Otrok, 1994). King and Watson used post-war U.S data and found evidence
in support of LMN and inconclusive evidence for LMSN. 2 Studies of LMN and LMSN for
developing countries is even more inconclusive. Tests for LNM amongst African
countries found that money has significant positive lasting effects in the long run
(Ekomie & Jacques, 2013). Tests for Mexico between 1932-1992 supported the LNM
when a time dummy was added for year domestic banks were nationalized in 1982
(Wallace, 1999). One very significant test in favor of LNM was for Turkey (Sulku, 2011).
Using Turkish data for M1, M2 and M3 between 1987-2006, she found LNM to hold for
all monetary measures. 3 The results for LNM seem to vary based on monetary
aggregates used, countries, aggregation method and years chosen.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3 develops the two-country
model along with estimates from the Markov process to test for asymmetric effect of
financial integration on macro variables, Section 4 includes tests and results for
monetary neutrality and section 5 concludes this paper.

Some other examples of studies testing for LMN and LMSN include Weber (1994),
Serletis and Koustas (1998) Leong and McAller (2000), Shelley and Wallace (2006)
3 Studies for developing countries include Bae and Ratti (2000) for Argentina and Brazil,
Chen (2007) for South Korea and Taiwan and they find some support for LNM.
2
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CHAPTER 3: ASYMMETRIC EFFECT OF FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION ON
BUSINESS CYCLE DYNAMICS
3.1 The Model
In this section I describe a two-country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
model (DSGE) with borrowers and lenders in each country. Countries are divided into
home and foreign and are denoted by the subscripts 1 and 2 respectively. A variable
with an asterisk represents foreign countries’ choices. For example, 𝑘,#
and 𝑘.#
∗

∗

represents home and foreign assets held by home investors and 𝑘,,#
and 𝑘.,#
represents

home and foreign assets held by foreign investors. Within each country there are
investors and savers. This utilizes the two-country model developed by Michael
Devereux and James Yetman. (Devereux & Yetman, Leverage constraints and the
international transmission of shocks, 2010)
Each country has fixed assets in home production for each period. Savers own
the production resources and lend them to investors in each country. In return
investors raise capital by issuing debt to the savers. Investors purchase the fixed assets
from savers and rent it to firms that produce the final good, thus owning equity claims
in production firms. Investors finance through debt and own equity portfolio in
production firms that are interconnected across countries. Savers can lend to investors
at home and foreign in an open international bond market. The most relevant case for
my study occurs when savers can lend to investors in both countries and investors can
lend to firms in both countries. These are the channels through which financial
integration significantly impacts cross-country output. Investors get paid a risky return
in exchange. This framework assumes that savers are more patient and less risky than
investors.

4

(Devereux & Yetman, Leverage constraints and the international

Due to the impatient and risky nature, investors will never accumulate enough resources to cover the
cost of investment in any period
4

16

transmission of shocks, 2010) (Devereux & Sutherland, Evaluating international
financial integration under leverage constraints, 2011)
Since investors are more risk prone than the savers, they face leverage
constraints in that the maximum amount of debt they can issue depends on their net
worth. They can trade claims with foreign investors to diversify their portfolio of equity
holdings.
Finally, both investors and savers supply labor resource inelastically to firms
that produce the final good. The model does not allow for endogenous capital
accumulation and variable labor supply. The focus of the paper by Devereux and
Yetman was to jointly analyze how binding and non-binding leverage constraints and
international portfolio diversification induce shocks across countries. The focus of this
chapter is to analyze the asymmetric effect of shock propagation in financially
integrated countries on macro variables in home and foreign. Therefore, only the most
globally integrated version of their model, one with integrated bond and equity markets
and where leverage constraints are binding, is relevant to my analysis.
3.2 Investors
Each country has a measure of n investors and 1 – n savers where the population
is normalized to unity. The representative investor, I in each country maximizes:
𝐸#

3
24# 𝜃2

𝑈 𝐶2- , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑠 𝜃2F,
= 𝛽 - 𝐶2- 𝜃2-

(1)

𝐶2- is consumption of the final good by the investor. Since the focus of this paper
is on international financial linkages I assume there to be one world good, as did the
authors whose model I am using. (Devereux & Yetman, Leverage constraints and the
international transmission of shocks, 2010) 𝐶2- is the economy wide average
consumption of investors and 𝛽 - ′ 𝐶2- ≤ 0. Hence the discount factor is defined such that
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the rate of time preference is increasing in consumption of the average investor and is
subject to diminishing returns.5 The investors maximize their utility function subject to
the following budget constraints:
𝐶#- + 𝑞,# 𝑘,#
+ 𝑞.# 𝑘.#
+ 𝑅#K, 𝐵#K,
= 𝑊#- + 𝑞,# + 𝑅,N# 𝑘,#K,
+ 𝑞.# + 𝑅.N# 𝑘.#K,
+ 𝐵#-

𝐵#- ≤ 𝜅# 𝑞,# 𝑘,#
+ 𝑞.# 𝑘.#

(2)
(3)

where subscripts 1 and 2 denote home and foreign. The right-hand side of
equation (2) represents the source of income; 𝑊#- , labor income from working in
domestic firms, 𝑞,# (𝑞.# ), represents the price of equity assets in home (foreign),
𝑅,N# (𝑅.N# ) are dividends earned from holding home (foreign) assets 𝑘,#K,
(𝑘.#K,
), that

were bought in the previous period. Lastly the investor raises capital by issuing new
debt 𝐵#- to savers.
They spend their income on consumption, 𝐶#- , home and foreign equity assets
from final goods producing firms and pay back previously issued debt with interest to
the savers.
As pointed out in the literature there is a reason why investors act as a
middleman and savers cannot directly lend to firms. (Bernanke, Gertler, & Gilchrist, The
financial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle framework, 1999) (Bernanke &
Gertler, 1999) (Devereux & Yetman, 2010) Investors specialize in transforming fixed
assets so they can be used by firms. Savers lend assets purely out of investment
purposes and gain utility from those returns and producing home goods.
Investors face another constraint modelling their ability to raise debt given in
equation (3). Savers will lend based on the ability of the investors to pay back. Total
debt cannot be larger than 𝜅 times the market value of current equity assets. The
In a model with different kinds of consumers within and across countries the assumption of endogenous
time preference is important in keeping stationary wealth distribution.
5
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investors’ value of assets to capital ratio or full leverage rate is 1/(1- 𝜅) when equation
(3) is binding. Equation (3) is a common way to model leverage constraints for
borrowers in both closed and open economies. (Aiyagari & Gertler, 1999) (Mendoza &
Smith, Quantitative implications of a debt-deflation theory of Sudden Stops and asset
prices, 2006) (Uribe, 2006) (Iacoviello, 2005) (Kiyotaki & Moore, 1997) 𝜅 is assumed to
be a fixed parameter by Devereux and Yetman, but I treat it differently in two ways.
First, instead of treating it as a fixed parameter, I estimate it based on the state of the
economy. My reasoning is that during recessions investors find it harder to borrow,
making 𝜅 a smaller number. In turn this reduces funds available for final goods
producing firms and further contracts the economy. The opposite is true during
economic expansions. I incorporate a Markov Switching Regime change to estimate
parameter 𝜅 using techniques developed by others. (Hamilton, 1994) (Hamiton, 2005)
(Perlin, 2015) Thus, there will be two values for the leverage rate for investors. This
process is described in section 5. Second, in addition to the usual productivity shock, I
include an extra source of shock in this model emanating from 𝜅, which differentiates
the ability of investors to borrow. This shock follows an AR process. This can be thought
of as a proxy for a shock to the financial sector.
The investor will maximize (1) subject to (2) and (3). The FOC’s are summarized
in Appendix A. Combining the FOC’s, one can derive the optimal portfolio selection for
investors.
𝐸# 𝑈 Q 𝐶#F,

RSTUS F VSWTUS
RST

−

RXTUS F VXTUS
RXT

=0

(4) and (I-9)

Equation (4) is used to determine the optimal equity portfolio for investors
between home and foreign investments. To obtain a unique solution for the optimal
equity portfolio requires a little more consideration. The usual linear solution around
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the steady state leaves the investor indifferent between choosing home and foreign
equity. I use the techniques developed in a different paper to solve for optimal
portfolios (Devereux & Sutherland, Country portfolios in open economy macro models,
2011). I lay out the solution methodology in section 3.6. Following trade literature, it is
useful to add transactions costs for international financial trade. Following (Tille &
Wincoop, 2007) an ‘iceberg’ cost, exp (−𝜏), is added to the term in equation (4) that
represents foreign equity purchased by home investor. Equation (4) becomes:

RSTUS F VSWTUS

𝐸# 𝑈 Q 𝐶#F,

RST

−

RXTUS F VXTUS
RXT

exp (−𝜏) = 0

(4’)

where exp (−𝜏) ≤ 1. Even though transactions costs associated with foreign purchases
are more prevalent when buying physical goods, fees involved in trading purely
financial transactions are worth incorporating. (Tille & Wincoop, 2007) and (Devereux
& Yetman, Leverage constraints and the international transmission of shocks, 2010)
assume 𝜏 to be small and a second order term. The fact that it is less than one does not
impact the first order dynamics of the model except the portfolio choice of investors.
Like the authors above, I set the transactions cost to ensure that domestic investors
hold 75 percent of home equity portfolios. When analyzing the shocks to the economy, I
calculate the impulse responses for both cases; 𝜏 = 0 and when 𝜏 > 0.
3.3 Savers
Savers’ are modeled by the utility function
𝐸#

3
]
24# 𝜃2

]
𝑈 𝐶2] , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜃2F,
= 𝛽 ] 𝐶2] 𝜃2]

(5)
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Like for the investor the model assumes 𝛽 ] ′ 𝐶2] ≤ 0 and 𝐶2] is the economy wide
aggregate consumption of savers. To differentiate the fact that savers are inherently
more patient than investors in terms of risk taking, the model assumes
𝛽 ] 𝑥 > 𝛽 - 𝑥 for all values of 𝑥

(6)

Savers buy some of the fixed assets from the market and buy debt from
investors. They supply labor in the final goods market and earn wealth from wages, and
]
their returns on investment. Some of the fixed asset, 𝑘,#
, bought by savers is used in
]
home production, 𝐺 𝑘,#K,
which is subject to diminishing returns. The model assumes

a saver to be indifferent between consumption of final good and buying fixed asset for
home production. These are perfect substitutes. Hence the budget constraint for the
savers is as follows:
]
]
]
]
𝐶#] + 𝑞,# k,#
= 𝑊#] + 𝑞,# 𝑘,#K,
+ 𝐺 𝑘,#K,
+ Β#] − 𝐵#K,
𝑅#K,

(7)

Savers do not have access to the same investment opportunities as the investors
and only buy domestic fixed assets. FOC’s are in Appendix A.
3.4 Production Firms
Profit maximizing final goods producing firms hire labor and fixed assets as
inputs and operate in a competitive environment. The production function takes the
form:
𝑌# = 𝐴# 𝐹 𝐿# , 𝐾#K,

(8)
∗

where 𝐾#K, = 𝑛(𝑘,#K,
+ 𝑘,,#K,
)

(9)

represents total use of fixed asset in home final goods production and are constrained
by 𝑊# 𝐿# + 𝑅,,N,# 𝐾#K, ≤ 𝑃# 𝑌#
3.5 Equilibrium

(10)
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In a two-country world, the market clearing exists in the market for the fixed
asset as well as the debt market. In a world with a common bond market:
𝑛 𝐵#- + 𝐵#-

∗

+ 1 − 𝑛 𝐵#] + 𝐵#]

∗

=0

(11)

where the total debt issued by home and foreign investors must equal total debt held by
home and foreign savers for any time-period t. The equilibrium for the fixed asset is
where for each country the total amount of fixed assets is held between domestic and
foreign investors and domestic savers (for home production).
∗

]
𝑛𝑘,,#
+ 𝑛𝑘,,#
+ 1 − 𝑛 𝑘,,#
=1

(12)

∗

where 𝑘,,#
represents the real holding of home assets by foreign country investors’ at

time 𝑡 + 1. The world clearing is then represented by:
𝑛 𝐶#- + 𝐶#∗

𝑘.,#K,

∗

+ 1 − 𝑛 𝐶#] + 𝐶#]

∗

∗

= 𝐴# 𝐹(1, 𝑛(𝑘,,#K,
+ 𝑘,,#K,
)) + 𝐴∗# 𝐹 1, 𝑛 𝑘.,#K,
+
∗

]
]
+ 1 − 𝑛 𝐺 𝑘,,#K,
+ 𝐺(𝑘.,#K,
)

(13)

Equation 13 implies the following; worldwide consumption equals final goods
and home good production, total labor supplied by savers and investors sum to unity,
resources (fixed factor) used by final goods producing firms equals the holdings by
home and foreign investors. (Devereux & Yetman, Leverage constraints and the
international transmission of shocks, 2010) They have four variants to their paper; first
two has a world with segmented bond and integrated equity markets with and without
binding leverage constraints, third and fourth has an international integrated bond
market with binding leverage constraints with and without integration of equity
markets. The variant with one international bond market has a single interest rate on
bonds. In this paper, I work with the case where bond and equity markets are
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integrated and leverage constraint is binding. This represents full portfolio
diversification and is the ideal setting to test my theory whether cross-country
correlation is stronger during recessions.
The equilibrium conditions are described by two sets of equations 2, 3, 7,12, I-6,
I-7, I-8, S-5, S-6, F-1, F-2. One that represents the outcome for home and another for
foreign. Additionally, there a single global equation 11 and 13 that correspond to the
global supply of debt and fixed assets. This gives us 24 equations in 23 variables 𝐶#- , 𝐶#] ,
∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

]
]
𝐶#- , 𝐶#] , 𝑘,,#
, 𝑘,,#
, 𝑘.,#
, 𝑘.,#
, 𝑘,,#
, 𝑘.,#
, 𝐵#- , 𝐵#] , 𝐵#- , 𝐵#] , 𝑞,,# , 𝑞.,# , 𝑊# , 𝑊#∗ , 𝑅# , 𝑅,N,# ,

𝑅.N,# , 𝜇# , 𝜇#∗ . Linear approximation around the non-stochastic steady state solves the
model.
However, as pointed out earlier in section 3.2 there is a known problem in
determining optimal portfolio choice in open-economy models with integrated equity
markets. When equity holdings are traded across countries, steady state representation
does not help determine the optimal portfolio in home and foreign equity. This occurs
because the investor is indifferent between home and foreign equity in a non-stochastic
steady state due to identical returns from home and foreign equity in equilibrium. I use
the method developed in another paper by (Devereux & Sutherland, Country portfolios
in open economy macro models, 2011) and (Devereux & Sutherland, Country Portfolio
Dynamics, 2010) to approximate the equilibrium portfolio. They develop the technique
by which a unique solution to the portfolio choice is made. This method uses a second
order approximation of the portfolio equation (4) or (4’) along with the first order
approximation of the rest of the model to develop the steady state conditions. Then one
can study how the stochastic structure of the model determines the portfolio allocation
along with the economy’s response to stochastic shocks. The equilibrium of the twocountry model determines the distribution of consumption, distribution as assets, asset

23

prices, interest rate, equity and debt holdings. The detail of this methodology is
described in section 3.7.
3.6 Steady State
Combining equations I-6, I-8, S-5, S-6 and F-2 gives us the steady state condition
to ensure that fixed assets are allocated efficiently between home production and final
goods producing firms:
𝐺 Q 𝑘,] =

j k ,Kj l
jl

,Kj k Km(j l Kj k )

𝐴𝐹. (𝐿, 𝑛𝑘#- )

(14)

where 𝑛𝑘#- is the total quantity of the fixed asset used by firms in the production of final
∗

goods. 𝑘,- = 𝑘,- + 𝑘,- is the sum of home fixed assets owned by home and foreign
investors. Finally, 𝑛𝑘,- + 1 − 𝑛 𝑘,] = 1. Equation (14) ensures that the marginal
product of the asset used in home production and final goods production are equal. The
binding restriction on how much debt investors can raise in equation (3) and their
inherent
𝛽- 1 − 𝛽 ]

impatience

in

equation

(6)

implies

that

[𝛽 ] 1 − 𝛽 - − 𝜅(𝛽 ] −𝛽 - )] < 1. When investors can trade freely in equities

between countries, the returns to must equalize across countries. And since the
discount factors are endogenously determined and impact consumption behavior,
returns for investors with trade in equities will inherently interact with consumption.
Equation (14) encompasses that link and implies that division of assets between home
and final goods production will be linked across countries as well. Productivity shocks
to one country will affect the tightness of leverage constraints across home and foreign
which in turn would impact output levels across countries.

3.7 Optimal Portfolio Choice and solution to the model
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The steady state allocation of the fixed asset given by equation 14 determines the
supply of equity in each country. Using the method in (Devereux & Sutherland, Country
portfolios in open economy macro models, 2011), described in this section, I determine
∗

∗

the share of each country’s equity held by home and foreign investors (𝑘,- , 𝑘,- , 𝑘.- , 𝑘.- );
where the measure of total equity issued by home country and held by home and
foreign investors is
𝑘#- = 𝑘#- + 𝑘#-∗

(15)

To represent the net international position of investors (since only investors
have access to foreign equity), 𝑟q# = 𝑟,# − 𝑟.# , the equation representing the budget
constraint for investors (2) can be rewritten as:
𝐶#- + 𝑁𝐹𝐴# = 𝑊#- + 𝑅,N# 𝑘,#K,
− 𝑞,# 𝑘,#
−𝑘,#K,
+ 𝑟.# 𝑁𝐹𝐴#K, + 𝑟q# 𝑞,#K, 𝑘,#K,
−
𝑘,#K, + 𝐵# − 𝑅#K, 𝐵#K,

(16)

where net foreign asset, 𝑁𝐹𝐴# = 𝑞.# 𝑘.#
− 𝑞,# (𝑘,#
− 𝑘,#
)

(17)

𝑟,# =

RST F VSW,T
RSTsS

NFA represents a country’s net foreign assets, or home investor’s ownership in
foreign equity relative to foreign investor’s ownership in home assets. 𝑟q,# measures
excess return on home assets. The benefit of writing the budget constraint for the
investor as equation (16) is that the term 𝑞,#K, 𝑘,#K,
− 𝑘,#K,
describes the portfolio

choice for a given NFA. Define
𝛼# = 𝑞,#K, 𝑘,#K,
− 𝑘,#K,

(18)

to represent the net holding of home equity by home investors. If no trade in equity is
allowed and home owners held all the home equity, 𝛼# would be zero. Conversely, if 𝛼#
is negative, it means home investors own less than 100 percent of all home equity and
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foreign investors own the remaining. 𝑁𝐹𝐴# − 𝛼# would then measure home investor’s
holding of foreign equity. In this model only equation (16) has the term for the optimal
portfolio, 𝛼# , present and the solution to which is obtained by taking the second order
approximation of equation (4) or (4’). Substituting 𝑁𝐹𝐴# and 𝑘,#
into equation (3), we

get;
𝐵#- ≤ 𝜅 𝑁𝐹𝐴# + 𝑞,# 𝑘,#

(19)

Thus, an increase in net foreign asset, 𝑁𝐹𝐴# , will loosen the leverage constraint
for home investors. But since 𝑁𝐹𝐴# + 𝑁𝐹𝐴∗# = 0, the leverage constraint for foreign
investors will simultaneously tighten. To that affect the degree to which international
linkages impact the transmission of shocks depends on the dynamics of net foreign
assets held, which in turn are dependent on portfolio choices, 𝛼# , made by home and
foreign investors.
Next I describe the solution method used in this paper. To solve a DSGE model,
one takes a linear approximation around the steady state of the model. However,
models with international portfolios do not have a unique steady state because first
order conditions lead the investor to treat home and foreign assets as perfect
substitutes. I use the typical method to solve for DSGE models for equations 2, 3, 7, 12, I8, S-5, S-6, F-1, F-2 for home and foreign, a single global equation 11 and 13 and use the
method in (Devereux & Sutherland, Country portfolios in open economy macro models,
2011) to solve for equation (4) or (4’) and obtain the optimal portfolio, 𝛼# . This is done
by combining a second order approximation of (4’) along with the first order
approximation of the rest of the equations. One must look at second order
approximation when looking at international portfolios because up to the first order,
investors are indifferent between home and foreign assets. Thus, portfolio allocation
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depends only on variance covariance of asset returns, which show up only in the second
order components of optimality conditions.
I use Uhlig’s method to take the second order approximation (Uhlig, 1999)
(McCandless, 2008) For a set of variables 𝑋# , define 𝑋# = 𝑙𝑛 𝑋# − 𝑙𝑛(𝑋) to be the
difference between a variable from its steady state. Then rewrite 𝑋# = 𝑋𝑒 wT . After
writing all variables in this form, take the Taylor expansion around of the exponential
term around its stationary value. Thus, the second order Taylor expansion of equations
∗

𝐸# 𝑈 Q 𝐶#F,
𝑟,#F, − 𝑟.#F, = 0 and 𝐸# 𝑈 Q 𝐶#F,
𝑟,#F, − 𝑟.#F, = 0 , 𝑟q# = 𝑟,# − 𝑟.# gives

us:
𝐸# 𝑟q,#F, +

,

𝐸# 𝑟q,#F, +

,

.

.

.
.
𝑟,,#F,
− 𝑟.,#F,
− 𝑈 Q 𝐶#F, 𝑟q,#F, = 0

(20)

.
.
𝑟,,#F,
− 𝑟.,#F,
− 𝑈 Q 𝐶 ∗ #F, 𝑟q,#F, = 0

(21)

Combining (20) and (21) yields
𝐸#

𝑈 Q 𝐶#F, − 𝑈 Q 𝐶 ∗ #F,

𝑟q,#F, = 0

(22)

,

,

.

.

.
.
and 𝐸# 𝑟q,#F, = − 𝐸# 𝑟,,#F,
− 𝑟.,#F,
+ 𝐸#

𝑈 Q 𝐶#F, + 𝑈 Q 𝐶 ∗ #F,

𝑟q,#F,

(23)

(Devereux & Sutherland, Country portfolios in open economy macro models, 2011)
show that equations (22) and (23) are sufficient to derive the optimal portfolio choice
for investors, 𝛼# .
Having a unique solution to all parts of the model, I solve the state space
representation of the model using Sims solution method.
3.8 Calibration, Estimation and Functional form
The goal of this chapter is to explore how international financial portfolio
interdependence affects cross-country macro variables under the different phases of a
business cycle. The macro variables to consider are asset prices, asset allocations,
levered investments. In this section I lay out the parameterization of the model. I
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employ the parameters commonly used in open economy models rather than estimating
it from the data generating process. Even though calibration might be less reliable, in
the case of my model there are far too many variables to get accurate data for multiple
countries to be able to estimate the parameters. Table 4 provides the calibrated
parameters.
Table 4: Calibrated parameters
Parameter
𝑛
Proportion of investors
1 − 𝑛 Proportion of savers
Discount function, Investors
𝜁]
Discount function, Savers
𝜁
𝜂
Discount function
𝜎
Coefficient of relative risk aversion
𝜀
Share of capital in final goods production
1 − 𝜀 Share of labor in final goods production
𝜔
Share of capital in home production
𝜅
Leverage, See section 5
𝜌
Productivity shock persistence
𝜑
Financial sector, de-leveraging shock persistence

Value
.5
.5
0.99
0.955
0.022
2
0.39
0.64
0.1
0.28, 0.791
0.9
0.9

Having equal number of savers and investors where investors face leverage
constraints is taken from the estimates from U.S economy (Campbell & Mankiw, 1990).
The discount factor, 𝛽 • , for investors and savers has the functional form;
𝛽• 𝐶 = 𝜁• 1 + 𝐶

K€

, 𝑖 = 𝐼, 𝑆 where 𝜂 is chosen to be 0.022 (Mendoza & Smith,

Quantitative implications of a debt-deflation theory of Sudden Stops and asset prices,
2006) and (Mendoza, 2006) 𝜁 should be defined differently for savers and investors to
represent their difference in patience. For savers, it is chosen to match an annual
interest rate of 4 percent and for investors it is chosen to reflect an interest premium on
borrowed funds of 2 percent. This premium on investors matches the typical spread on
corporate debt. (Bernanke, Gertler, & Gilchrist, The financial accelerator in a
quantitative business cycle framework, 1999)
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The value for leverage constraint, 𝜅, has important quantitative implications on
the model. Total investment relative to capital or total leverage ratio is 1/(1- 𝜅). There
are two alternatives that I analyze for 𝜅; one during a recession and another during
expansions. I estimate the parameter, 𝜅 during the two regimes using a markov
switching model using data for U.S from 1995-2012 (Hamiton, 2005) (Hamilton, 1994).
This is done in section 5. The estimate during recessions is 0.28 and 0.79 during
expansions. Devereux and Yetman use the value of 0.5 following other studies
(Bernanke & Gertler, 1999). But given that investors enjoyed high leverage in years
prior to the 2007 crisis, I look at both possibilities. I would expect that the case with
high leverage, shocks would have a larger impact.
The utility function has the function form 𝑈 𝐶 =

„ Ss…
,K†

with elasticity of

substitution equaling 0.5 implying relative risk aversion, 𝜎 = 2.
The production function is a typical Cobb-Douglas function with technology:
𝐹 𝐿, 𝐾 = 𝐴 𝐿,Kˆ 𝐾 ˆ , where the share of capital is chosen using the conventional
economic measure of 0.36, which matches the percent of capital in GDP for G-7
countries. The home production sector is represented by 𝐺 𝑘 ] = 𝑍 𝑘,]

Š

. The share of

fixed assets used in a country is more heavily used by the final goods producing firms.
(Benhabib, Rogerson, & Wright, 1991) calibrated the share of capital in home
production to be 0.09. In this paper, in steady state, 90 percent of the fixed assets in a
country are used in final goods production.
Finally, there are two shocks experienced by both countries. First shock from the
standard macro business cycle literature emanates from productivity shocks in the final
goods sector. The stochastic process for the above shock is:
log(𝐴# ) = 𝜌 log(𝐴#K, ) + 𝜐#

(24)
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where 𝜌 = 0.9, and the error term has mean zero and variance 0.005 (Devereux &
Sutherland, 2011) (Jermann & Quadrini, 2009, 2012) Jermann and Quadrini estimate
the variance in productivity shocks in the U.S economy over the sample 1984-2009.
During the financial crisis of 2007, it was apparent that the shocks to the
countries were to the financial sector itself. (Kollman, Enders, & Mueller, 2011) In
response to risky behavior, bank portfolios deteriorated leading to de-leveraging
amongst investors. In this model, a negative shock to the variable 𝜅 could represents
forced de-leveraging by investors. A shock to 𝜅 can be thought as borrower or investor
specific and constraints the ability of investors to borrow. This enables one to study
responses in an economy emanating directly from the financial sector. This is useful
since productivity shocks effect the financial and non-financial sector simultaneously.
That makes it hard to understand whether the effects on consumption and investment
are directly from productivity or a lagged effect of productivity on financial links. The
shock process to the financial sector follows:
ln(𝜅# ) = 𝜑 ln(𝜅#K, ) + 𝜀#

(25)

with 𝜀# ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎#. ), where 𝜎#. = 0.011. following (Jermann & Quadrini, 2009, 2012),
who estimate the standard deviation of financial shock.
3.9 Markov Switching Regime
An important contribution of my paper is to test whether macro variables have a
stronger correlation during economic recessions than expansions. The model laid out in
(Devereux & Yetman, Leverage constraints and the international transmission of
shocks, 2010) provides a useful environment to test my theory. Now that I have
summarized the appropriate parts of that model, I can test the impact of balance sheet
contractions on countries during the two phases of a business cycle. I use the parameter
𝜅 in equation 3 to explicitly incorporate recessions and expansions into the model. 𝜅
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represents leverage constraints faced by investors and ensures that investors can
borrow some percent of the value of their assets. This lowers the ability of investors to
issue bonds without any risk consequence. This ability must be more limiting during
recessions for the following reasons. First, savers will want to hold on to safer assets
even at the cost of lower returns due to the uncertainty in the economy. Due to
increased unemployment, they will not be looking for new investment opportunities.
This is especially true amongst risk averse savers. Second, lower interest rates by
central bankers during recessions would lower investment opportunities in the
economy in general. These reasons would ensure that investors will not be able to
leverage out their capital as much. The reverse would be true during expansionary
phase.
I employ a markov-switching regime to estimate this effect. This technique
enables me to incorporate the two phases of the business cycles by estimating two
values for leverage ratio. Since 𝜅 impacts investors directly, I can then analyze the effect
of a shock to 𝜅 on home and foreign country during the two regimes of the model,
business expansions and contractions. Consider equation (26):
𝜅•’# = 𝛽“• + 𝛽,• 𝑆# 𝑍•’# + 𝛽.• 𝜅•’#K, +𝛽”• 𝑋•’#K, + 𝜀•’#

(26)

.
𝜀•’# ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎2#
)

where 𝜅•’# represents the leverage ratio in period 𝑡 of bank 𝑖 headquartered in country
𝑗. This ratio is measured as the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets of banks. Tier 1
capital is the bank’s core capital as defined by the Basel III accord, which is the
international regulatory accord designed to supervise bank risk. It includes
shareholders’ equity and retained earnings. The lagged term for leverage ratio
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represents short term adjustments costs for banks arising from rigidities in the capital
markets. Such rigidities make it hard for them to raise capital at short notice due to
negative capital shocks. (Myers & Majluf, 1984) The coefficient on this term is what I
estimate to be the leverage constraint parameter, 𝜅 for the model in previous sections.
Using the coefficient on the lagged variable makes sense since most borrowing has
already happened when the economy goes into a recession. Bond market loans takes
time to reach maturity and a lag of one period gives savers and investors time to adjust
their behavior. Thus, if after a loan matures, savers do not wish to renew their loans,
they can choose not to.
Variable 𝑍•’# is the measure for real GDP for the U.S. 𝑆# is the switching
parameter, taking on a value of 0 if the economy is in the state of a recession and 1 for
expansions. I use the NBER data to determine the state of the U.S. economy between
1995-2012. Ideally, I would like to include data for the two states for all countries, but
that is not possible given the two states do not necessarily coincide every year for every
pair of country. However, since U.S is typically, and certainly during the 2007 crisis, the
biggest source of financial turmoil that propagates globally, it proves useful to use U.S
business cycles to estimate the transition matrix. Lastly, 𝑋•’#K, is a vector with bank
specific characteristics like bank size (log of total bank assets) and bank profitability
(return on assets, ROA). Defining 𝑋•’#K, to isolate bank specific characteristics is used by
other authors as well. (Ayuso, Perez, & Jesus, 2004) (Gropp & Heider, 2009).
𝑧# = ∆ln (𝑦# ) = 𝑙𝑛 𝑦# −𝑙𝑛 𝑦#K, is the transformation of output into its first logged
difference to adjust for the unit root observed in annual output data. Unit root tests and
data details and characteristics are presented in appendix B. ADF and PP unit root tests
reject the presence of unit root in either data after appropriately adjusting the data. The
years are chosen to encompass multiple business cycles across the countries. I estimate
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the parameters using maximum likelihood procedure, which takes on the log likelihood
function:
𝑙𝑛 𝐿 =

›
#4, 𝑙𝑛

.
’4,

𝑓 𝜅# |𝑆# = 𝑗, Φ 𝑃𝑟 𝑆# = 𝑗

(27)

where 𝑗 represents the two states, 𝑓 𝜅# |𝑆# = 𝑗, Φ is the likelihood function for state 𝑗
conditional on the set of parameters Φ in equation (26).
The dynamics of the switching process is driven by the transition matrix;
𝑝,,,
𝑃= 𝑝
,,.

𝑝.,,
𝑝.,. , where 𝑝•,’ is the probability of switching from state 𝑗 to 𝑖. The

results are presented in table 5. The transition probabilities represent the usual
persistence observed in output data. Given that the economy is in a recessionary
(expansionary) phase, it is very likely that we will stay in that phase. The parameter of
note is 𝛽. , which is what I use as a proxy for 𝜅. Parameter 𝜅 is almost three times higher
in expansions, which mean the ability of investors to raise capital in expansions is
higher, as I had expected. The coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level.
These results suggest that a negative shock in home country will have a more
severe effect on macro variables during recessions. One should also expect to see the
correlation between home and foreign to be stronger during recessions than
expansions. Using the estimated values for 𝜅, in the next section I analyze the impulse
responses of shocks to both productivity and financial sector.
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Table 5: Estimated results of the Markov Switching model on Leverage Ratio
Maximum Likelihood Estimates

Dependent
variable: 𝜅#

Leverage ratio of banks: Tier 1 capital to total
assets
coefficient

standard error

𝛽““

0.19

.8

𝛽“,

0.895***

0.249

𝛽,“

-0.152***

0.019

𝛽,,

-0.046**

0.023

𝛽.“

0.28***

0.009

𝛽.,

0.791***

0.057

𝑝“,“

0.9

𝑝,,,

0.78

AIC

382

BIC

449

Sample period is from 1995-2012
***, **, * represents significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level

3.10 International transmission of shocks
In this section I look at the effect of productivity and financial shocks to both
home and foreign countries. When looking at negative productivity shock in home
country, I calculate the responses using 𝜅=0.28 and 𝜅=0.791 for both with and without
transactions costs 𝜏. This exercise will enable me to test whether cross country
correlations are stronger during recessions. With transactions costs, I would expect
home investors to not diversify completely causing the effect on foreign country to be
smaller. When imposing a shock to the leverage parameter, 𝜅 (equation 25), I calculate
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the responses without transactions costs. The responses in both home and foreign are
to consumption of final goods by investors and savers, asset prices, investor borrowing,
asset allocation, home country trade surplus and the global lending rate.
3.11 Productivity shock
First I concentrate on the impact of a one percent negative productivity shock in
the home country. Figures 2 through 5 illustrates these effects. Figures 2 and 3
represent the case where the leverage constraint is high, 𝜅=0.791 and figures 4 and 5
assumes 𝜅=0.28. The case where 𝜅=0.791 would imply that investors can leverage their
capital more easily. This was the behavior observed in the decade prior to the crash of
2007 where investors could borrow without much capital requirement. I am using such
environment as a proxy for good economic times, or business cycle expansions. The
case where 𝜅=0.28 would then imply that borrowing is tougher representing economic
downturns.
Figure 2 assumes that investors can borrow unrestrictedly from home and
foreign without any transactions fees. Investors satisfy condition in equation 4. Figure 3
includes such international fees. Transactions costs are incorporated in the model by
ensuring that investors hold seventy-five percent of home equity.6 (Devereux & Yetman,
Leverage constraints and the international transmission of shocks, 2010) A fall in 𝐴#
causes an immediate fall in home output and thus reduces wages for savers and
investors and asset prices in home country. This reduces home consumption. Lower
demand for foreign assets reduces foreign asset prices, wages and consumption in
foreign country. However, the degree of reduction is more severe at home than in
foreign. In the case with transactions costs (figure 3), consumption in home falls by
more. This happens because due to transactions costs, cross country channels are
6

Investors chose values for 𝑘,- and 𝑘.- to satisfy equation 4’ such that 𝑘,- = .75𝑘,-
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slightly subdued. With a diversified portfolio, the shock also generates a valuation effect
for home investors, causing home investor’s net foreign assets to rise. Simultaneously,
this reduces foreign investor’s net foreign asset and a tightening of foreign leverage
constraint. This leads to a reduction in borrowing by foreign investors as well. Thus,
both home and foreign investment falls sharply. This is a result of financial links
between countries since there was no productivity shock in foreign country. Thus, fall in
foreign investment takes place purely through balance sheet linkages.
Adding transactions costs reduces the cross-country effects due to home
investors bias towards home assets. Greater portfolio diversification leads to greater
sensitivity of foreign balance sheets to domestic asset price, and thus a larger balance
sheet contraction to a negative home productivity shock. This means that the country
where the shock occurs is less important than the pattern of equity holdings of
investors for business cycle responses.
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Figure 2: High leverage constraint, no transactions costs

Impulse responses of a one percent negative productivity shock with leverage
constraint being high 𝜅=0.791, integrated bond markets (𝑅# = 𝑅#∗), and integrated
equity markets with complete portfolio diversification (𝜏 = 0)
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Figure 3: High leverage constraint, with transactions costs

Impulse responses of a one percent negative productivity shock with leverage
constraint being high, 𝜅=0.791, integrated bond markets (𝑅# = 𝑅#∗ ), and integrated
equity markets with incomplete portfolio diversification (𝜏 > 0)
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Figures 4 and 5 look at the case where 𝜅=0.28 and figure 6 measures the
difference in home and foreign consumption based on the value for 𝜅. A lower estimate
for 𝜅 from the markov switching model represents times of economic downturn as
measured by NBER. The impulse responses under a lower 𝜅 implies how home and
foreign economies would react to a negative productivity shock during recessions. As
hypothesized earlier, both consumption and borrowing fall by a larger percent with a
lower 𝜅. Moreover, the degree to the synchronous behavior of reduced consumption
and investment is greater during recessions. As illustrated in figure 6, the difference in
fall in consumption between the countries is far smaller during recessions than
expansions. There is clearly a positive co-movement of economic activity across
countries with integrated equity and bond markets.
These results support the fact that during recessions, consumers reduce
spending and investors reduce borrowing by more than they increase during
expansions, as I had suspected. And these affects are more severe due to the financial
linkages and cross-country spillovers. Thus, it is no surprise that during the 2007 crisis,
global economic contraction was more severe and synchronous than the increase in
economic activity before and since the crisis.
Financial integration in equity and bond markets allow for cross-country risksharing. But as seen in this chapter, it also generates a “contagion” effect, which is more
severe during recessions than expansions. The ease with which investors can diversify
their portfolio has certainly increased the degree of macroeconomic co-movement.
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Figure 4: Low leverage constraint, no transactions costs

Impulse responses of a one percent negative productivity shock with leverage
constraint being low, 𝜅=0.28, integrated bond markets (𝑅# = 𝑅#∗ ), and integrated
equity markets with complete portfolio diversification (𝜏 = 0)
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Figure 5: Low leverage constraint, with transactions costs

Impulse responses of a one percent negative productivity shock with leverage
constraint being low, 𝜅=0.28, integrated bond markets (𝑅# = 𝑅#∗ ), and integrated
equity markets with incomplete portfolio diversification (𝜏 > 0)
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Figure 6: Difference in variables across business cycles

Difference in impulse responses from a one percent negative productivity
shock across low and high leverage constraints, 𝜅=0.28, 0.791, integrated
bond markets (𝑅# = 𝑅#∗ ), and integrated equity markets with complete
portfolio diversification (𝜏 = 0)
3.12 Financial sector shock
Another contribution of this chapter is to study negative financial sector shock
on home and foreign countries. This shock is governed by equation (25). Again, the
most globally integrated version of the Devereux and Yetman model is used. A one
percent fall in 𝜅 represents a negative financial sector shock. Figure 7 shows the effect
of such a shock to home and foreign consumption, asset prices, borrowings by investors,
asset holdings and lending rate.
There is perfect co-movement between asset prices and fixed assets between the
two countries, which is very different to earlier shocks. Since there is no direct
productivity shock in either country, investors allocate fixed assets identically across
countries, leading to identical asset prices. Despite the financial shock affecting only
home country investors, the shock leads to a perfect co-movement of asset prices and
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Figure 7: Financial sector shock, without transactions costs

Impulse responses of a one percent negative financial shock with integrated equity
and bond markets (𝑅# = 𝑅#∗), with complete portfolio diversification (𝜏 = 0)
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allocation. The level of borrowing however, contracts much sharply for home investors
than foreign investors. This might signify a loss in faith due to uncertainty in financial
home markets. Consumption in both countries falls sharply, but increases temporarily
beyond the steady state for foreign investors and savers. The global interest rate
declines sharply due to low investments but start to rise as borrowings increase.
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CHAPTER 4: TEMPORAL AGGREGATION AND MONEY NEUTRALITY TESTS FOR G-7
COUNTRIES
The function of money in an economy has been a central question for policy
makers. In this chapter, I perform the Fisher and Seater (1993) and King and Watson
tests for G-7 countries using different frequency data to test for biases arising from
temporal aggregation. Temporal aggregation can bias neutrality test results because of
its impact upon the sample autocorrelations in the data. The contribution of my work is
to test whether temporal aggregation biases the results in any way. VAR-based tests
results in the finding of neutrality when data is temporally aggregated. For countries
with monthly data available, those tests strongly reject money neutrality, where nonneutrality gets rejected at quarterly and annual frequency. Results from single equation
Fisher and Seater (F&S) tests point towards money to be not neutral and are not
affected by temporal aggregation. Those tests, however do find that effect of money
dissipates over time for most countries.
The next section sets the framework for the F&S tests with section 4.2 doing the
same for VAR based K&W tests. Section 4.3 examines the results.
4.1 Fisher and Seater’s ARIMA framework
Fisher and Seater develop a framework of log linear, stationary ARIMA model
with log of nominal money supply 𝑚# and log of real GDP 𝑦# as the two variables. The
ARIMA framework provides a convenient setting where one can test nonstructural
tests. They find that order of integration of both money and the macro variable used is
important when testing for long run neutrality (LRN) and long run super-neutrality
(LRSN). Specifically, the relative order of integration matters. To test for LRN they
derive the long run derivative of money on macro variable of interest. To start, the two
equations of interest are:
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𝑎 𝐿 ∆ Ÿ 𝑚# = 𝑏 𝐿 ∆ ¡ 𝑦# + 𝑢#

(1)

𝑑 𝐿 ∆ ¡ 𝑦# = 𝑐 𝐿 ∆ Ÿ 𝑚# + 𝑤#

(2)

where 𝑚 and 𝑦 are the orders of integration for 𝑚# and 𝑦# respectively. The
difference operator ∆ ensures that the variables are integrated of order zero, I(0) . They
assume 𝑎“ =𝑑“ =1 and 𝑏“ , 𝑐“ are not restricted. The LRN experiments will depend on a
shock to the exogenous money supply disturbance 𝑢# and how that impacts macro
variables. The treatment of the disturbance 𝑢# requires appropriate identification
restrictions described later. The vector of errors (𝑢#, 𝑤# )′ are independent and
identically distributed with zero mean and variance covariance matrix Σ, to be

𝜎££
= 𝜎
¤£

𝜎£¤
𝜎¤¤

If one assumes 𝑥# = ∆• 𝑚# and 𝑧# = ∆’ 𝑦# where 𝑖 and 𝑗 are equal and either 0 or 1, then
to test LRN and LRNS one needs to define the long run effect of a permanent change in
𝑥# on 𝑧# . This long run effect is measured by the long run derivative of 𝑧 with respect to
𝑥, LRDz,x;
𝐿𝑅𝐷¦,q = lim

©→3

𝜕(𝑧#F© ) 𝜕(𝑢# )
𝜕(𝑥#F© ) 𝜕(𝑢# )

The numerator measures the effect of an exogenous money disturbance on the
macro variable of interest through time and the denominator looks at that same effect
on money itself. As stated in Fisher and Seater, if the limit of the denominator term
𝜕(𝑥#F© ) 𝜕(𝑢# ) approaches zero, LMN and LMSN cannot be tested (Fisher & Seater,
1993). In other words, when there are no permanent changes in monetary variables,
there is nothing to test.
Therefore lim 𝜕(𝑥#F© ) 𝜕(𝑢# ) ≠ 0 and 𝑚 ≠ 0
𝑘→∞

As in F&S, equations (1) and (2) can be written using the Wold representation of
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𝑎(𝐿)
∆𝑚#
=
∆𝑦#
−𝑐(𝐿)

−𝑏(𝐿)
𝑑(𝐿)

K,

𝑢#
𝛼(𝐿)
𝑤# = 𝛾(𝐿)

𝛽(𝐿)
𝜆(𝐿)

𝑢#
𝑤#

(3)

where;
𝛼 𝐿 =𝑑 𝐿 / 𝑎 𝐿 𝑑 𝐿 −𝑏 𝐿 𝑐 𝐿
𝛾 𝐿 =𝑐 𝐿 / 𝑎 𝐿 𝑑 𝐿 −𝑏 𝐿 𝑐 𝐿
𝛽 𝐿 =𝑏 𝐿 / 𝑎 𝐿 𝑑 𝐿 −𝑏 𝐿 𝑐 𝐿
𝜆 𝐿 =𝑎 𝐿 / 𝑎 𝐿 𝑑 𝐿 −𝑏 𝐿 𝑐 𝐿
F&S show that for (𝑥) ≥ 1 the long run derivative, LRDz,x can be rewritten as;
𝐿𝑅𝐷¦,q =

1−𝐿

qK¦

𝛾(𝐿)/²4,
𝛼(1)

and the derivative will depend on 𝑥 − 𝑧 . F&S examine various cases for the order of
integration of 𝑥 and 𝑧 to get the LRD. To consider the I(1) property observed for money
and output, as in Rossana and Hu, I look at the case where 𝑥 = 𝑧 = 1. (Rossana & Hu,
2017)7 This restriction also implies that changes in both money and output are
permanent thus allowing us to test for LRN. Certain very broad measures of money
(M4) are found to be I(2), but I use M2 for all tests and do not run into that problem.
With the case where 𝑥 = 𝑧 = 1, LRN is equivalent to testing whether the long run
derivative equals zero when using real variables or one when using nominal variables.
Thus, from equation (3) testing for neutrality is equivalent to testing the restriction
𝑐 1 /𝑑 1 = 0 or 1
where 𝑏 1 = 𝜎£¤ = 0. This makes only estimating equation (2) relevant of the two
equations system.

This is following the work by Nelson and Plosser (1982), that find most macro
variables including output and money to be I(1).
7
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4.11 Identification and Estimation
To deal with the identification problem, there are two specific schemes under
which one can consistently estimate equation (2), as pointed in F&S and Rossana & Hu.
𝑑 𝐿 ∆ ¡ 𝑦# = 𝑐 𝐿 ∆ Ÿ 𝑚# + 𝑤#
Under the first one, the covariance term in equation (2) 𝑐“ = 𝜎£¤ is assumed to be zero.
The current value of change in money does not enter equation (2). This is appropriate
when using real output, which does not respond to a change in money
contemporaneously when using short measurement period i.e. monthly. Since most of
my data are quarterly and yearly, this scheme will not be relevant. The other scheme
involves assuming 𝑏“ = 𝜎£¤ to equal zero. In this case money is predetermined in
equation (1). It is possible, however, that neither schemes are acceptable. But as
pointed by F&S, 𝑐 𝐿 /𝑑 𝐿 are structural and not of interest. Only the reduced form
𝑐 1 /𝑑 1 are of relevance, which can be estimated directly in the frequency domain.
A General Scheme
The reduced form representation 𝑐 1 /𝑑 1 is of importance in conducting these
statistical tests. The autocovariance generating function for the vector

∆𝑚#
can
∆𝑦#

defined to be 𝑀 𝑧 = 𝐻(𝑧)∑𝐻(𝑧 K, )Q , and the spectrum at frequency 𝜔 is then
𝑆 𝜔 = 𝑀(𝑒 K•Š ) 2𝜋. When ∆ ¡ 𝑦# is regressed on ∆ Ÿ 𝑚# at frequency zero 𝜔 = 0, the
estimated coefficient equals 𝑆., (0)/𝑆,, (0) = 𝑀., (1)/𝑀,, (1). This equals 𝑐 1 /𝑑 1 if
the following restriction is met:
𝑏 1 = 𝜎£¤ = 0

(4)

Thus, testing LRN involves estimating and testing 𝑆., (0)/𝑆,, (0). Condition (4) implies
that a permanent change in output has no effect on money in the long run and allows for
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both 𝑏“ and 𝑐“ to be non-zero. Thus, money is exogenous in the long run, which is
crucial in neutrality tests.
Estimation Under the General Scheme
By regressing change in output on change in money at zero frequency, the coefficient
𝑆., (0)/𝑆,, (0) is the LRN under the general identification scheme, which implies
exogeneity of money supply. Frequency zero spectrums 𝑆., 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆,, (0) need to be
estimated.
𝑆.,

𝑆,,

1
0 =
2𝜋
1
0 =
2𝜋

3

𝛾¡Ÿ (ℎ)

(5)

𝛾ŸŸ (ℎ)

(6)

·4K3
3

·4K3

where 𝛾ŸŸ (ℎ) is the h-th order autocorrelation for change in money and 𝛾¡Ÿ (ℎ) is the
h-th order cross-correlation between change in output and change in money.
Nonparametric estimation needs to be used for estimating the spectrums since the
sample periodograms for 𝑆., 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆,, (0) obtained by replacing the sample crosscorrelations and autocorrelations in (5) and (6) are inaccurate, albeit unbiased
estimators with large sample size. Therefore, Bartlett kernel of the zero-frequency
regression coefficient is used, which can be calculated using moving averages of the
observations. This is because as pointed in Priestley, the Bartlett estimator smooths the
periodogram using linearly decreasing weights. (Priestley, 1981) As pointed out in F&S,
the Bartlett estimator of the frequency-zero regression coefficient can be seen by
writing the covariance of the moving averages of the observations in terms of the
aotocovariances:
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©K,

𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝑚# − 𝑚#K© , 𝑦# − 𝑦#K© = 𝑐𝑜𝑣

©K,

∆ 𝑚#K• ,
•4“

∆ 𝑦#K•
•4“

©K, ©K,

=

©K,

𝛾¡Ÿ 𝑖 − 𝑗 = 𝑘º»¼ 0 + 2
•4“ ’4“

𝑘 − 𝑖 𝛾¡Ÿ (𝑖)
•4“

and the Bartlett estimator of the zero-frequency ratio 𝑆., 0 /𝑆,, (0) can be estimated as
lim 𝑏© , where 𝑏© is the slope coefficient from the regression

©→3

©
¡
•4“ ∆

𝑦#K• = 𝑎© + 𝑏©

©
¡
•4“ ∆

𝑚#K• + 𝑒©#

(7)

For the case where 𝑚 = 𝑦 = 1, which is what I look at here, equation (7) becomes:
(𝑦# − 𝑦#K© ) = 𝑎© + 𝑏© 𝑚# − 𝑚#K© + 𝑒©#

(8)

The assumption of m and y to be of order 1 is a common practice in this literature.
(Sulku, 2011) (Ekomie & Jacques, 2013) The estimator: 𝑐 1 /𝑑 1 is obtained from
equation (8) as lim 𝑏© . In this case, 𝑏© is the slope scatterplot of output and money
©→3

growth rates and the Bartlett estimator is the limit of that slope as the span over which
those growth rates are computed goes to infinity.
Hence, testing for LRN involves only estimating equation (8). Next section
develops the VAR tests for LRN and the following section summarizes the data and
results from both the Fisher and Seater single equation and King and Watson bivariate
VAR tests.
4.2 Bivariate VAR Test
VAR tests for neutrality and superneutrality developed by King and Watson (1997)
provides another common toolset. The VAR equations modeling output and money are:

½

∆𝑦# = 𝜆¡Ÿ ∆𝑚# +

½
€

𝛼’,¡¡ ∆𝑦#K’ +
’4,

𝛼’,¡Ÿ ∆𝑚#K’ + 𝜀#
’4,

(9)
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½

∆𝑚# = 𝜆Ÿ¡ ∆𝑦# +

½

𝛼’,ŸŸ ∆𝑚#K’ + 𝜀#Ÿ

𝛼’,Ÿ¡ ∆𝑦#K’ +
’4,

(10)

’4,

where the VAR is of order p. To test for contemporaneous money and output effects, I
use the augmented VAR framework of K&W. The framework used is:
𝜆¡Ÿ
∆𝑦#
=
∆𝑚#
𝑜

𝑜
𝜆Ÿ¡

𝛽¡¾ 𝐿
∆𝑚#
+
∆𝑦#
𝛽Ÿ¾ 𝐿

𝛽¡Ÿ 𝐿
𝛽ŸŸ 𝐿

¾

𝜉#
𝜉#Ÿ

(11)

where contemporaneous effects of money and output is allowed, ∆ is the differencing
operator, the matrix 𝛽(𝐿) contains lag polynomials that transmit the effects of iid
¾

shocks, 𝜉#Ÿ and 𝜉# . If the fraction:
𝛾¡Ÿ =

𝛽¡Ÿ (1)
=0
𝛽ŸŸ (1)

then money is neutral since a permanent shock to money has no effect on output. 𝛽•’ (1)
is the sum of the coefficients in the lag polynomial 𝛽•’ (𝐿). Since I will be using monthly
data for my estimations, following Rossana and Hu (2017), I will be assume 𝜆¡Ÿ = 0.
Without making such an assumption one must estimate 𝜆¡Ÿ and 𝜆ŸŸ . King and Watson
provide a possibility of estimating one of these parameters in a reduced form VAR using
GMM since it is not possible to identify both 𝜆¡Ÿ and 𝜆ŸŸ . They do not use high
frequency data and as pointed by Rossana and Hu, lags between money and output are
typically longer than a quarter. Thus, the assumption of 𝜆¡Ÿ = 0 seems empirically
justifiable. For estimations using annual frequency, on the other hand, such an
assumption can be misleading. Including intercepts, the VAR becomes:
𝛽¡¾ (𝐿)
𝜇¡
∆𝑦#
= 𝜇 +
∆𝑚#
𝛽Ÿ¾ (𝐿)
Ÿ

𝛽¡Ÿ (𝐿) 𝜉#¾
𝛽ŸŸ (𝐿) 𝜉#Ÿ

which can be transformed into

(12)
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𝛽¡¾ (𝐿)
𝛽Ÿ¾ (𝐿)

𝛽¡Ÿ (𝐿)
𝛽ŸŸ (𝐿)

K,

𝜇¡
∆𝑦#
− 𝜇
∆𝑚#
Ÿ

𝛽¡¾ (𝐿)
Let the inverse matrix
𝛽Ÿ¾ (𝐿)
𝛼 (𝐿)
𝛼 𝐿 = ,,
𝛼., (𝐿)

¾

=

𝛽¡Ÿ (𝐿)
𝛽ŸŸ (𝐿)

𝛽¡¾ (𝐿)
𝛼,. (𝐿)
=
𝛼.. (𝐿)
𝛽Ÿ¾ (𝐿)

𝜉#
𝜉#Ÿ

(13)

K,

which will be estimated, be written as

𝛽¡Ÿ (𝐿)
𝛽ŸŸ (𝐿)

K,

= 𝛽(𝐿)

K,

𝛽ŸŸ (𝐿)
−𝛽Ÿ¾ (𝐿)

−𝛽¡Ÿ (𝐿)
(9)
𝛽¡¾ (𝐿)

and finally, the VAR to be estimated becomes
𝛼,, (𝐿)
𝛼., (𝐿)

𝛼,. (𝐿)
𝛼.. (𝐿)

𝜇¡
∆𝑦#
− 𝜇
∆𝑚#
Ÿ

¾

=

𝜉#
𝜉#Ÿ

(14)

and the estimate for money neutrality is

𝛾¡Ÿ = −

ÀSX (,)
ÀSS (,)

(15)

For money to be neutral, 𝛾¡Ÿ must equal zero and 𝛼,, (1) ≠ 0, otherwise tests for
neutrality cannot be done. In estimating 𝛾¡Ÿ , the estimation of the standard errors
become crucial, since the significance of the 𝛾¡Ÿ parameter will depend on it. As in
Rossana & Hu, I use the delta method to construct the standard errors. The polynomials
in the matrix 𝛽•’ (𝐿) are in the bivariate vector moving average process where neutrality
measure is defined and 𝛼•’ (𝐿) are the parameters to be estimated. The standard errors
are constructed by computing the matrix multiplication
𝑉 Q Σ 𝑉where Σ is the parameter covariance matrix and V is the vector
𝜕𝛾¡Ÿ
𝜕𝛼,,
𝑉 = − 𝜕𝛾
¡Ÿ
𝜕𝛼,.

(16)
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4.3 Empirical Results
This section presents the empirical evidence of temporal aggregation of data on
neutrality tests. All results were obtained using MATLAB and STATA software. My
contribution to this literature is to investigate whether temporal aggregation biases
results from the single equation Bartlett or the bivariate VAR estimators.
I calculate this estimate to test LMN for all G-7 countries. The data is obtained
from the OECD, IMF, St. Louis Federal Reserve and Bank of England databases. A detail
description of the years and frequency of data used is presented in Appendix D. For U.S,
U.K and Japan all units across all variables are in local country currency. For the other
European countries, all output and consumption measures are in local currency and
money is in domestic country Euros. In other words, it represents the Euros issued for
each of those countries individually and not for the Euro area as a whole. Augmented
Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests are performed on the data to test for unit root and variables
are found to be I(1) (Dickey & Fuller, 1981). All the figures estimating the Bartlett
kernel, 𝑏© as 𝑘 becomes large are in Appendix E. Long run neutrality would exist if this
parameter goes to zero over time.
One commonly documented problem when testing neutrality tests is the effects
of aggregated data. (Rossana & Seater, 1995) As pointed out in their paper, there is
substantial loss of information in moving from high frequency monthly data to
quarterly data and coefficients results from regression are dramatically affected.
(Rossana & Seater, 1995) They point out that using high frequency data is preferred. I
test for temporal aggregation biases using methods in Rossana & Hu (2017). For the U.S.
and U.K, I use real consumption and M2 (M3 for U.K) to derive aggregated monthly,
quarterly and annual data and compare it quarterly and yearly real GDP and M2 (M3 for
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U.K). For the other five countries, I do the same using quarterly real GDP and M2 to
derive lower frequency data.
4.31 Fisher and Seater Single Equation Evidence
Appendix E has all the figures containing the Bartlett estimator 𝑏© . Figures 11-15
show neutrality tests for the U.S. Figures 11-13 represent monthly, quarterly and
annual real consumption and M2 using temporally aggregated monthly data and figures
14 and 15 are using quarterly and yearly Real GDP and M2 data respectively. The
results are very similar across data frequencies and consistently find money to be not
neutral. Non-neutrality disappears as lag length increases. For lag lengths between ten
to twelve years, the consumption effects are close to zero, but not quite within the
standard error at monthly and quarterly frequencies. However, at annual frequency,
consumption effects, within the standard error, reach zero around the nine-year mark.
So, money is neutral at the annual level using temporally aggregated monthly data. At
very long lags for all estimates, beyond around the fourteen-year mark, the parameters
at all frequency increase sharply. However, one must be cautious in reading too much
into the results at very long lags due to decreasing sample size. One surprising result
from all these tests is that money is not neutral at very short lag lengths. Economists
widely agree that there is a lag on the effect of money on real variables and so we
should see money to be neutral at very short lag lengths. Overall, for the U.S. temporal
aggregation has minimal effect on Bartlett parameter estimates. And money is not
neutral where non-neutrality dissipates around year ten.
In figure 14, using quarterly real GDP and M2, at very short lag length money has
no effect on output. This is perhaps the most appealing result in the case for U.S, since
this is what economic wisdom would suggest we should observe. Beyond lag of three,
money effects real macro activity which dissipates over time. Neutrality is reached
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around lag length of thirty using quarterly data. Using annual data, in figure 15,
neutrality is reached around the ten-year mark, but then non-neutrality arises at longer
lag lengths.
Figures 16-18 represent test results for Canada. Like what I observed for the U.S.,
data aggregation does not matter for Canada either when going from quarterly to
annual frequency. Figure 16 uses quarterly Real GDP and M3 and finds that money is
neutral at very short lag length of one, which dissipates quickly. Neutrality reaching at
lag length forty-five or about fifteen years within one standard error. When aggregating
quarterly data into annual in figure 17, there is strong evidence for money neutrality
within the standard error and money has no effect on real output until year ten. Again,
as mentioned before at higher frequencies, due to smaller sample one must be cautious.
At annual frequency money is neutral at very small lag lengths, which is what one would
expect, but neutrality dissipates quickly. As is evident from figures 17 and 18, temporal
aggregation is not important. Results from Canada at all frequency are appealing since
we can confidently say that money has no effect on real variables in the very short run.
France: Figures 19-21 represent test results for France. Data aggregation does not
matter for France when going from quarterly to annual frequency. Figure 19 uses
quarterly Real GDP and M2 and finds that money is neutral, and neutrality does not
dissipate until after 7 years. When aggregating quarterly data into annual in figure 20,
there is strong evidence for money neutrality within the standard error and money has
no effect on real output. At annual frequency, the results are very similar to those
reached under temporal aggregation. As is evident from figures 19 and 20, temporal
aggregation is not important. Results from France at all frequency strongly support
monetary neutrality. One does have to be a little careful in the validity of tests for all
European countries due to such small sample sizes.
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Figures 22-24 represent test results for Germany where data aggregation does
not matter when going from quarterly to annual frequency. Figure 22 finds that money
is not neutral, and non-neutrality does not dissipate at any frequency. When
aggregating quarterly data into annual in figure 23, money is not neutral, where nonneutrality dissipates at lag lengths of ten. At annual frequency (figure 24), the results
are identical to those reached with temporal aggregation. As is evident from figures 23
and 24, temporal aggregation is not important. For the case of Germany, temporal
aggregation matters a little and LRN is weakly supported.
Figures 25-27 represent test results for Italy where data aggregation matters.
Figure 25 finds that money is not neutral, and non-neutrality does not dissipate at any
frequency. When aggregating quarterly data into annual in figure 26, money is not
neutral. At annual frequency (figure 27), the results look very different to those
obtained with temporal aggregation. As is evident from figures 26 and 27, temporal
aggregation is important, but neither support long run neutrality. For the case of Italy,
temporal aggregation matters and money effects real variables across all lags and
temporal aggregation.
Figures 28-30 represent test results for Japan. Figure 28 finds that money is not
neutral when using quarterly data, and non-neutrality does not dissipate at any
frequency. When aggregating quarterly data into annual in figure 29, money is neutral
at very short lags of two after which it is not neutral. At annual frequency in figure 30,
the neutrality that is observed with temporal aggregation disappears. As is evident from
figures 29 and 30, temporal aggregation is important.
Lastly figures 31-35 represent monthly, quarterly and annual real consumption
and M3 using temporally aggregated monthly data and quarterly and yearly Real GDP
and M3 respectively for United Kingdom. The results are very similar across quarterly
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and annual frequencies, with and without temporal aggregation. All frequency and
aggregation techniques consistently find money to be neutral. Money has no real effects
on macro variables in the very short run in all cases, which is very promising. For
consumption data neutrality lasts for four to six years after which money is non-neutral.
So, money is neutral at the quarterly and annual levels using temporally aggregated
monthly data. Overall, for the U.K. temporal aggregation has minimal effect on Bartlett
parameter estimates, as was seen for U.S. Using quarterly and yearly real GDP and M3,
neutrality is reached very quickly and dissipates around year eight to ten.
4.32 Bivariate VAR evidence
Table 6 reports the estimated neutrality measures and the corresponding standard
errors from the VAR framework for U.S and U.K. For the remaining five countries, these
results are presented in Appendix E. Lag lengths for the tests were chosen using Hannan
and Quinn (1979) method as they are known to be consistent. A parameter with ***
signifies that for that time frequency, we can reject the fact that gamma is statistically
different from zero with ninety-nine percent confidence. ** and * represent the level of
certainty at the ninety-five and ninety percent levels.
Table 6: VAR results for United States

Date frequency

Measure

Lag length

𝜸𝒎

Standard Error

Monthly

Real C and M2

3

0.155***

0.059

Quarterly

Real C and M2

3

0.264**

0.129

Quarterly

Real GDP and M2

2

0.339

0.57

Annual

Real C and M2

1

0.185

0.135

Annual

Real GDP and M2

1

0.247

0.139
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Table 7: VAR results for United Kingdom

Date frequency

Measure

Lag length

𝜸𝒎

Standard error

Monthly

Real C and M3

3

0.167***

0.066

Quarterly

Real C and M3

3

0.314**

0.139

Quarterly

Real GDP and M3

3

0.219

0.457

Annual

Real C and M3

2

0.585

0.561

Annual

Real GDP and M3

1

0.654

0.537

VAR tests clearly signify that temporal aggregation can distort neutrality tests.
For the U.S, results at monthly frequency strongly reject monetary neutrality since the
coefficient is significantly different from zero at the one percent level. But, as data gets
temporally aggregated, non-neutrality results become less compelling with neutrality
emerging when using annual data. Thus, confidence in non-neutrality declines as data
gets temporally aggregated. The optimal lag lengths decrease as data gets aggregated
from quarterly to annual, but not when going from monthly to quarterly.
Results from the U.K shows that money is not neutral at the one percent and ten
percent levels using monthly and temporally aggregated quarterly data. However
monetary neutrality exists when data gets aggregated at the annual frequency.
For the remaining countries, the results are presented in Appendix E, tables 11
through 15. Using quarterly data money is significantly different from zero for Canada,
France and Italy, but non-neutrality cannot be rejected for Japan and Germany. When
aggregating quarterly data to get annual frequency, money is neutral for Canada, Japan
and Germany, but neutrality is strongly rejected for Italy and France. Annual level data
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rejects non-neutrality for all countries. Hence, the results for all seven countries suggest
that VAR results are very sensitive to temporal aggregation.
Sensitivity of results to lag length chosen is well known in VAR literature. King
and Watson use lag lengths of six in their studies. To compare the dynamic adjustment
period from Bartlett estimates (Fisher and Seater), I calculated impulse responses for
all countries to orthogonalized innovations in the estimated VAR’s and found the results
to be consistent. These impulse responses are not reported in this paper.
To summarize, the Bartlett estimator is unaffected by temporal aggregation for
five of seven countries but the results from the VAR approach is extremely sensitive for
six of seven countries. Japan being an interesting case where F&S tests consistently
rejects neutrality, but the VAR’s do not for all frequency and aggregations.

59

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
Chapter 1 uses an already developed testable theoretical model to test the effects
of international linkages in financial markets and their impact on macro variables. I use
the model developed by Devereux and Yetman to build a two-country model with
financial linkages through investors borrowing from savers in both home and foreign.
The ability of investors to lend to final goods producing firms creates the channels
through which borrowing and these international effects take place. I further the
literature on international macroeconomics by testing whether these financial linkages
have a more profound effect during recessions than expansions.
Results suggest that contractions in both consumption by savers and lenders and
investment in both home and foreign are stronger during recessions than in expansions.
I measure this effect by looking at leverage constraints faced by investors; Tier 1 assets
to capital by major banks amongst fourteen countries. I assume that investors face
tighter leverage constraints during recessions than expansions. This happens because
savers require investors to hold more capital to asset ratio during economic downturn.
Other authors calibrate this parameter and assume it to be constant. This paper
employs a Markov regime switching model to estimate this parameter using maximum
log likelihood method. Using output data for the U.S, I find the parameter for leverage
constraints to be more than three times higher during expansions than recessions,
implying that investors face a severe tightening of funds.
This results board well for public policymaking where most central banks lower
interest rates and easy lending during recessions. This was especially true during the
recession of 2007. An important result for countries that are financially integrated with
the rest of the world is that when a negative shock is experienced in another country,
the home country can act preemptively.
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A second contribution of chapter 1 is to include shocks directly in the financial
markets. I then look at both a negative productivity and financial sector shock. A
surprising result of the financial shock is that there is perfect correlation in asset prices
in home and foreign. Lastly, chapter 2 looks at neutrality tests using Fisher and Seater
method across G-7 countries and finds mixed results in support of long run neutrality of
money. The long debated, theoretically sound and yet empirically inconclusive LMN
does not get any clearer after my tests.
There are a few extensions to my first chapter that are worth mentioning.
Building capital adjustments across international portfolios, estimating the other
parameters and including a central banking mechanism into the model would make this
economy more realistic. Including monetary policy by central banks might help capture
some of the missing dynamics of financial linkages.
The chapter on neutrality tests provides a much less convincing support of its
hypothesis. Using the Fisher and Seater Bartlett estimators, money is neutral for France,
Germany and U.K. VAR results suggest the same for Japan, Germany and U.K. for all
frequencies. Even though proving monetary neutrality is a mixed bag, a convincing
aspect of the Fisher and Seater tests is that the results are unaffected by temporal
aggregation. This is an appealing feature of the F&S tests. VAR results on the other hand
are extremely sensitive to temporal aggregation and must be considered with caution.
Money plays a very important role in an economy and it would be worth including
monetary variables in the two-country model from chapter 1.
One aspect of neutrality tests I did not consider are biases from structural
change. The data set used by Fisher and Seater in their original work was using data
from Friedman and Schwartz (1982), which covers U.S. data from 1867 to 1975. We
know that data in that time-period had several structural breaks from the Industrial
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Revolution to monetary policy. It would be worthwhile to run the tests I do here across
the different regimes for these countries to get a more robust understanding.

62

APPENDIX A
Investors maximize equation (1) subject to equations (2) and (3). Bellman equation is:
𝑉 𝑘,#K,, 𝑘.#K,, 𝐵#K, = 𝑈 𝐶#- + 𝐸# 𝛽 - 𝐶#- 𝑉 𝑘,#
, 𝑘.#
, 𝐵,# + 𝜆# 𝑊#- + 𝑞,# + 𝑅,N# 𝑘,#K,
+
𝑞.# + 𝑅.N# 𝑘.#K, + 𝐵# − 𝑅#K, 𝐵#K, − 𝐶# − 𝑞,# 𝑘,# − 𝑞.# 𝑘.# + 𝜇# 𝜅 𝑞,# 𝑘,# + 𝑞.# 𝑘.# −
𝐵#(I-1)
where 𝑘,#
, 𝑘.#
and 𝐵#- are the state variables and 𝐶#- the control variable. 𝜆# is the

multiplier on the budget constraint and 𝜇# the multiplier on the leverage constraint,
𝜇# being positive means that the investor would like to borrow more.
FOC:
𝐶# : 𝑈 Q 𝐶#- = 𝜆#
ÅÆ •
𝐵# : 𝐸# 𝛽 - 𝐶#= −𝜆# + 𝜇#

(I-2)

ÅÈ#

Envelope Theorem states that
dv •
𝜕𝑣(•)
𝑑𝑣 •
=
= −𝜆# 𝑅#K, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑜
= −𝜆#F, 𝑅#
db#K, 𝜕𝑏#K,
𝑑𝑏𝑡
𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐸# 𝛽 - 𝐶#- 𝜆#F, 𝑅# + 𝜇# = 𝜆#

(I-3)

𝑘,# : 𝐸# 𝛽 - 𝐶#- 𝜆#F, (𝑞,#F, + 𝑅,N#F,) ) = 𝜆# 𝑞,# − 𝜇# 𝜅 𝑞,#

(I-4)

𝑘.# : 𝐸# 𝛽 - 𝐶#- 𝜆#F, 𝑞.#F, + 𝑅.N#F,) = 𝜆# 𝑞.# − 𝜇# 𝜅 𝑞.#

(I-5)

combining the FOC’s we get the Euler equations
RSTUS F VSWTUS
𝐶# & 𝑘,# ⤇ 𝑈 Q 𝐶#- = 𝐸# 𝛽 - 𝐶#- 𝑈′ 𝐶#F,
+ 𝜇# 𝜅

(I-6)

RST

RXTUS F VXÎ,TUS

𝐶# & 𝑘.# ⤇ 𝑈 Q 𝐶#- = 𝐸# 𝛽 - 𝐶#- 𝑈 Q 𝐶#F,

RXT

+ 𝜇# 𝜅

𝐶# & 𝐵# ⤇ 𝑈 Q 𝐶#- = 𝐸# 𝛽 - 𝐶#- 𝑈 Q 𝐶#F,
𝑅# + 𝜇#

(I-7)
(I-8)

Facing leverage constraints does not impose any restrictions on diversifying the
portfolio of equity holdings. (3) restriction applies equally to borrowing domestic or
foreign equity. Hence (I-6) and (I-7) gives us the portfolio selection condition:
𝐸# 𝑈 Q 𝐶#F,

RSTUS F VSW,TUS
RST

−

RXTUS F VXÎ,TUS
RXT

Like Devereux and Yetman, I define 𝑟,,#F, =
be written as

=0

RSTUS F VSW,TUS
RST

(I-9)
and the previous equation can
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𝐸# 𝑈 Q 𝐶#F,
𝑟,,#F, − 𝑟.,#F, = 0

(I-10)

combining equations (I-6), (I-7) and (I-8) we can solve for 𝜇#
𝜇# = 𝐸# 𝛽

-

𝐶#-

𝑈′

𝐶#F,

ÏST WST
ÏST WST UÏXT WXT

ÏSTUS UÐSWTUS
ÏST

F ,K

ÏST WST
ÏST WST UÏXT WXT

ÏXTUS UÐXWTUS
ÏXT

KVT

,Km

(I-10)
This shows that when 𝜇# > 0, the expected return on the portfolio exceeds the cost of
borrowing. Using (I-10) one can derive the optimal equity portfolio for investors.
Savers maximize equation (5) subject to equations (7). Bellman equation is:
]
]
𝑉 𝑘,#K,, 𝛣#K, = 𝑈 𝐶# + 𝐸# 𝛽 𝐶# 𝑉 𝑘,#, 𝐵# + 𝜆# [𝐶#] + 𝑞,# 𝑘,#
− 𝑊#] − 𝑞,# 𝑘,#K,
−
]
]
]
𝐺 𝑘,#K, − 𝐵# + 𝐵#K, 𝑅#K, ]
(S-1)

FOC:
𝐶# : 𝑈′𝐶# ) = −𝜆#
]
𝑘,# : 𝐸# 𝛽 ] 𝐶#] −𝜆#K, 𝑞,#F, + 𝐺 Q 𝑘,#
𝐵# : 𝐸# 𝛽 𝐶# −𝑅# 𝜆#F, = 𝜆#

= −𝜆# 𝑞,#

combining the FOC’s
]
𝐶# & 𝑘,# ⤇ 𝑈 Q 𝐶#] = 𝐸# 𝛽 ] 𝐶#] 𝑈 Q 𝐶#F,

l
RSTUS FÒ Q ©ST

RST

]
𝐶# & 𝐵# ⤇ 𝑈 Q 𝐶#] = 𝐸# 𝛽 ] 𝐶#] 𝑈 Q 𝐶#F,
𝑅#

(S-2)
(S-3)
(S-4)

(S-5)
(S-6)

Production Firms maximize (8) subject to equation (10)
FOC:
𝐿# ⤇ 𝑊# = 𝐴# 𝐹, (𝐿# , 𝐾#K, )

(F-1)

𝐾#K, ⤇ 𝑅,N,# = 𝐴# 𝐹. (𝐿# , 𝐾#K, )

(F-2)

𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴# = 𝜌𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐴#K, + 𝜐#
System of Equations:
As mentioned in section 3 of the paper the equilibrium is described by equations
2, 3, 7,12, I-6, I-7, I-8, S-5, S-6, F-1, F-2 for home and foreign along with a single
global equation 11 and 13.
𝐶#- + 𝑞,# 𝑘,#
+ 𝑞.# 𝑘.#
+ 𝑅#K, 𝐵#K,
= 𝑊#- + 𝑞,# + 𝑅,N# 𝑘,#K,
+ 𝑞.# + 𝑅.N# 𝑘.#K,
+
𝐵#
(2)
𝐵#- ≤ 𝜅 𝑞,# 𝑘,#
+ 𝑞.# 𝑘.#
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒

(3)
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]
]
]
]
𝐶#] + 𝑞,# k,#
= 𝑊#] + 𝑞,# 𝑘,#K,
+ 𝐺 𝑘,#K,
+ Β#] − 𝐵#K,
𝑅#K,
𝑈 Q 𝐶#- = 𝐸# 𝛽 - 𝐶#- 𝑈′ 𝐶#F,
𝑈 Q 𝐶#- = 𝐸# 𝛽 - 𝐶#- 𝑈 Q 𝐶#F,

RSTUS F VSWTUS
RST

+ 𝜇# 𝜅

RXTUS F VXÎ,TUS

(I-6)

+ 𝜇# 𝜅

RXT

(I-7)

𝑈 Q 𝐶#- = 𝐸# 𝛽 - 𝐶#- 𝑈 Q 𝐶#F,
𝑅# + 𝜇#

(I-8)

l
RSTUS FÒ Q ©ST
RST

]
𝑈 Q 𝐶#] = 𝐸# 𝛽 ] 𝐶#] 𝑈 Q 𝐶#F,

(7)

(S-5)

]
𝑈 Q 𝐶#] = 𝐸# 𝛽 ] 𝐶#] 𝑈 Q 𝐶#F,
𝑅#

(S-6)

𝑊# = 𝐴# 𝐹, (𝐿# , 𝐾#K, )

(F-1)

𝑅,N,# = 𝐴# 𝐹. (𝐿# , 𝐾#K, )

(F-2)

∗

]
𝑛𝑘,,#
+ 𝑛𝑘,,#
+ 1 − 𝑛 𝑘,,#
=1
∗

=0

∗

= 𝐴# 𝐹(1, 𝑛(𝑘,,#K,
+ 𝑘,,#K,
)) +

∗

+ 1 − 𝑛 𝐵#] + 𝐵#]

∗

+ 1 − 𝑛 𝐶#] + 𝐶#]

𝑛 𝐵#- + 𝐵#𝑛 𝐶#- + 𝐶#-

(12)
(11)
∗

∗

∗

]
]
+ 1 − 𝑛 𝐺 𝑘,,#K,
+ 𝐺(𝑘.,#K,
)

𝐴∗# 𝐹 1, 𝑛 𝑘.,#K,
+ 𝑘.,#K,

(13)

(I-6) and (I-7) are combined into (I-9) or equation (4), (4’) in the paper.
Solution as developed in (Devereux & Sutherland, Country portfolios in open economy
macro models, 2011)
The system of equations is solved by log-linearizing around a non-stochastic steady
state by computing the second order approximation of the portfolio equation 4 along
with a first order approximation of the rest of the model. In a two-country model with
portfolio choices we have:
𝐸# 𝑈 Q 𝐶#F,

RSTUS F VSW,TUS
RST

−

RXTUS F VXÎ,TUS
RXT

=0

𝐸# 𝑈 Q 𝐶#F,
𝑟,,#F, − 𝑟.,#F, = 0

where 𝑟,,#F, =

RSTUS F VSW,TUS
RST

(I-9)
(I-10)

and 𝑟q,#F, = 𝑟,,#F, − 𝑟.,#F,

Equation (I-9) exists for home and foreign:
∗

𝐸# 𝑈 Q 𝐶#F,
𝑟q,#F, = 0 and 𝐸# 𝑈 Q 𝐶#F,
𝑟q,#F, = 0

(I-11)
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APPENDIX B
Appendix B contains the data source used in section 5 to estimate the Markov estimate:
Annual frequency data for leverage ratio is from a commercial database maintained by
the International Bank Credit Analysis (IBCA). U.S real GDP measure is from OECD
database. The data for both real GDP and leverage ratio is from 1995-2012 amongst 14
OECD countries. This range of years includes multiple business cycles.
Table 8: Summary of country and bank asset database
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Table 9: Summary statistics for Tier 1 capital to total assets and output

Table 10: Unit root tests for Tier 1 capital to total assets and output
Variable

ADF I(1)

PP I(1)

Log Real GDP
-6.8** (1)
-7.03** (1)
Log tier 1 capital to assets
-13.6** (1)
-11.6* (1)
5% significance level is denoted by **
Lag length is chosen using SIC criteria and is represented in
parenthesis
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APPENDIX C
The impulse responses from the two-country DSGE model with Monto Carlo error
bands are presented here for select variables. The dashed blue lines are the bands
around the home curves and the black dashed lines for foreign.
Figure 8: Productivity shock with high leverage constraint, no transactions costs
(corresponds to Figure 2)
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(c) Asset in final goods sector
0
-0.4
-0.8
-1.2
-1.6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Total home equity

10

11

12

13

14

15

Total foreign equity

Figure 9: Productivity shock with low leverage constraint, with transactions costs
(corresponds to Figure 5)
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(c) Asset in final goods sector
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Figure 10: Financial sector shock, without transactions costs
(corresponds to Figure 7)
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APPENDIX D
Appendix D describes the data used for money neutrality tests. Data sources include the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD), St. Louis Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. In converting
money variables from higher to lower frequencies, the standard stock conversion
method of using the last monthly or quarterly measurement in the year is used to
generate lower frequency data. For output and consumption, the method of summing
monthly to get quarterly and quarterly to get annual data is used.
Table 11: Data description for Money Neutrality F&S and VAR tests

Canada

France

Germany

Italy

Japan

United
Kingdom

United
States

Variable
M3
M3
GDP
GDP
M2
M2
GDP
GDP
M2
M2
GDP
GDP
M2
M2
GDP
GDP
M2
M2
GDP
GDP
M3, Index
M3, Index
M3, Index
C
GDP
GDP
M2
M2
M2
C
GDP
GDP

Frequency
Quarterly
Annually
Quarterly
Annually
Quarterly
Annually
Quarterly
Annually
Quarterly
Annually
Quarterly
Annually
Quarterly
Annually
Quarterly
Annually
Quarterly
Annually
Quarterly
Annually
Monthly
Quarterly
Annually
Monthly
Quarterly
Annually
Monthly
Quarterly
Annually
Monthly
Quarterly
Annually

Time
1970Q1-2017Q1
1970-2016
1970Q1-2017Q1
1970-2016
1980Q4-1998Q4
1977-1998
1980Q4-1998Q4
1960-2016
1970Q1-1998Q4
1970-1998
1970Q1-1998Q4
1970-1998
1974Q1-1998Q2
1974-1998
1974Q1-1998Q2
1974-1998
1970Q1-2016Q4
1970-2016
1970Q1-2016Q4
1970-2016
M121986-M82016
1987Q1-2016Q4
1983-2016
M121986-M82016
1987Q1-2016Q4
1983-2016
1960-2016
1960Q1-2017Q1
1960-2016
1960M1-2016M12
1960Q1-2017Q1
1960-2016

Source
IMF
IMF
OECD
OECD
IMF
IMF
OECD
OECD
IMF
IMF
OECD
OECD
OECD, IMF
OECD, IMF
OECD
OECD, IMF
IMF
IMF
OECD
OECD
OECD
IMF
OECD
BOE
OECD
OECD
IMF
IMF
IMF
St. Louis Fed
OECD
OECD
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APPENDIX E
Money neutrality results using Fisher & Seater methodology using different temporal
aggregation schemes for G-7 countries. The graphs below represent the Bartlett
Parameter Estimates with confidence interval bands around the parameter.
United States
Figure 11: Monthly Real Consumption and M2

Figure 12: Aggregated quarterly Real Consumption and M2
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Figure 13: Aggregated annual Real Consumption and M2

Figure 14: Quarterly Real GDP and M2
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Figure 15: Annual Real GDP and M2

Canada
Figure 16: Quarterly Real GDP and M3
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Figure 17: Aggregated annual Real GDP and M3

Figure 18: Annual Real GDP and M3
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France
Figure 19: Quarterly Real GDP and M2

Figure 20: Aggregated annual Real GDP and M2
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Figure 21: Annual Real GDP and M2

Germany
Figure 22: Quarterly Real GDP and M2
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Figure 23: Aggregated annual Real GDP and M2

Figure 24: Annual Real GDP and M2
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Italy
Figure 25: Quarterly Real GDP and M2

Figure 26: Aggregated annual Real GDP and M2
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Figure 27: Annual Real GDP and M2

Japan
Figure 28: Quarterly Real GDP and M2
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Figure 29: Aggregated annual Real GDP and M2

Figure 30: Annual Real GDP and M2
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United Kingdom
Figure 31: Monthly Real C and M3

Figure 32: Aggregated quarterly Real C and M3
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Figure 33: Aggregated annual Real C and M3

Figure 34: Quarterly Real GDP and M3
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Figure 35: Annual Real GDP and M3
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APPENDIX F
VAR based parameter estimates along with the standard error using the delta method
for Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Japan are summarized in Appendix F. Results for
U.S and U.K were reported within the paper for no other reason than the fact that I had
data at all three frequency for U.S and U.K. The evidence is more compelling when I
could aggregate data from monthly to quarterly and annual frequencies. *, ** and ***
represents whether we are 90, 95 and 99 percent sure that the parameters are
statistically significantly different from zero.
Table 12: VAR results for Canada
Date frequency

Measure

Lag length

𝜸𝒎

Standard Error

Quarterly

Real GDP and M3

3

0.264**

0.129

Aggregated Annual

Real GDP and M3

1

0.185

0.135

Annual

Real GDP and M3

1

0.254

0.165

Table 13: VAR results for France
Date frequency

Measure

Lag length

𝜸𝒎

Standard Error

Quarterly

Real GDP and M2

3

0.183*

0.099

Aggregated Annual

Real GDP and M2

2

0.285*

0.188

Annual

Real GDP and M2

1

0.354

0.211

Table 14: VAR results for Germany
Date frequency

Measure

Lag length

𝜸𝒎

Standard Error

Quarterly

Real GDP and M2

3

0.186

0.229

Aggregated Annual

Real GDP and M2

1

0.301

0.335

Annual

Real GDP and M2

1

0.29

0.165
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Table 15: VAR results for Italy
Date frequency

Measure

Lag length

𝜸𝒎

Standard Error

Quarterly

Real GDP and M2

2

0.198***

0.061

Aggregated Annual

Real GDP and M2

1

0.343*

0.188

Annual

Real GDP and M2

1

0.609

0.411

Table 16: VAR results for Japan
Date frequency

Measure

Lag length

𝜸𝒎

Standard Error

Quarterly

Real GDP and M2

3

1.213

1.019

Aggregated Annual

Real GDP and M2

1

1.485

1.088

Annual

Real GDP and M2

1

0.964

0.811
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Financial crisis of 2007 provides a renewed interest in financial market linkages
and their effect on macro variables. In an open-economy dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model setting, two things are investigated in this paper. First, what role do
financial linkages play in propagating asymmetric cross-country dynamics. Specifically,
the impact of a productivity shock in home country leads to a more synchronous
behavior in consumption and investment in recessions than in expansions. Secondly, a
new source of shock is included, one in the financial sector itself. Cross-country asset
prices and fixed assets move identically in this scenario implying perfect risk-sharing.
Lastly, testing for effects of temporal aggregation on neutrality based tests provide
mixed results. F&S tests are immune to temporal aggregation amongst all but one G-7
countries while VAR results are very sensitive to temporal aggregation.
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